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IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISffRI T OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF\LE
IS
I
I

I

i
i

PERRY KRINITT,

NO. CV 12-146 j

Plaintiff,

I

i

DEFENDANTS' iME
I

v.
IDAHO DEPAR1MENT OF FISH AND
GAME and STATE OF IDAHO,

Defendants.

AUTHORITIES INS
MOTION FOR RiEco
OF A PORTION
JUDGMENT MEMO
...""""'.,,.,..
I
ORDER AND JU,DG

PF
i

i
[Oral Argument ~eque ted]

I

I
I. INTRODUCTION

i
I

I

Defendants (hereinafter ..IDFG") respectfully disagree with the Court's

.

I

it based its decision to award attorney fees and costs to Plaintiff from ~arr.
Ii

ysis upon which
31~ 2014, to the

present. These sanctions were assessed against IDFG because the Court heid
I

I

.

a particular dispositive motion prior to the cut-off date in the initial scheduling
o der. IDFG submits
I
I
I

.

.

that this is not the case. IDFG filed two separate dispositive motions priori to th January .31, 2014,
I

i
I

j

i

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF AU'l'HOrun::ES IN

reJ:

SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION· l
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i

I

schedule order deadline- both ofwhich were granted. The granting ofthes, mo · ns was clispositive
i
.
of the entire case and the complaint was accordingly dismissed by the Co;urt o July 7, 2014.
i

II. BACKGROUND

I
I

I

i

This case was origin.ally filed on August 30, 2012. The initial scheij.ulin order provided for
I

I

the filing ofdispositive motions by January '.l 1, 2014. Defendaut. complied ~th
t t schedulmg order
I
I

by filing two summary judgment motions) the first of which addressed th~ cl ·

of Eryrin Peralta.;

!
and the second based upon IDFG' s position that the remaining Piaintiff c;~uld ot demonstrate the
I

i

requisite elements of a negligence claim.

iI
I

I

I

On January 21, 2014, the Court granted IDFG's summary judgmtjnt m tion dismissing the
!
I
I

claims of Brynn Peralta. She did not appeal this order. On January 31, 20J4,
I

I

summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of Mr. Krinitt's remainingjcla' s. The Court heard
i

argument on this motion on May 30, 2014, and entered an order grantinlg

ary judgment on

!

July 7, 2014. This ruling was dispositive of the remainder of the case. Op. Jul .7, 2014, the Court

.

I

entered a judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice and vacating the ·al date, which had
I

i

i

been set for September 22, 2014.

i
Mr. Krinitt appealed the dismissal. Oral argument took place before/the I
I

o Supreme Court

on August 28, 2015. On October 2, 2015, the Idaho Supreme Court ~ssu
i
I

reversed the dismissal, and on October 26, 2015,. remanded the case to the
I
i
I

proceedings. At the time the case was remanded, there was no longer a s~hed ing order in place.
!

The trial court conducted a scheduling conferenc~ with counsel on Nofem r 19, 2015, during
I

which the Court strongly encouraged the parties to consider mediation. After
I
!

issued two orders dated November 24, 2015, requiring the parties to medi~te th matter and setting

I

i
I
I
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a new trial date of October 17, 2016. During this scheduling conference, th~ p

07/14

es' counsel advised

i

the Court that some discovery remained which they had agreed to defer pen'ding
ruling by the Court
I
I
I

on the second summary judgment motion. See Affidavit of Peter J. Joht,tson. he Court left it to

.

I

counsel to prepare a new scheduling order. Counsel again agreed to defer $is

!
time to scheduling and conducting a mediation. See Affidavit of Peter J. Jo

.

I

As is well known to the Court, mediation scheduling was diffic4lt.

e parties could not

;
I

agree on the selection of a mediator. Mr. Krinitt insisted on one of

four C
I

. ornia lawyers or a

I

Montana lawyer. Pursuant to the Court's order to mediate, the parties su~mitt d a list of proposed
I

:

i

mediators from which the Court intended to select a mediator. On Janllfil'Y 3, 2016, the Court
i

conducted a teleconference with counsel to select a mediator from th~ p

·es' proposed lists.

I

I

Shortly prior to that confe:ren.ce, the Court and IDFG were advised that Pllf:suan to a doctor's order~
!

:Mr. Krinitt could not travel to the Northwest for the mediation due to he~th i sues. See Affidavit
i

i

I
The Court struck a compromise by requiring Mr. Krinittto submit abedi

of Peter J. Johnson.

I

I

.

letter confimring

i

bis inabpity to travel to the Northwest, by selecting a retired Idaho judge }¥ho

i
to California for the mediation. and pennitting IDFG to decide if it w~uld till participate in a

i

mediation in. Southern California. See Affidavit of Peter J. Johnson. The ~o
I

I

made it clear that it
.

would not compel IDFG to mediate in California and indicated that it wopld r quire Mr~ Krinitt to
;

pay certain expenses of the mediator to travel to California. See Affid~vit
Notwithstanding that a representative of the Idaho Risk Management jDep
.

I

ent and defense

I

counsel would have to travel to California, IDFG agreed to participate in good aith in mediation in
I

i

.

Southern California. See Affidavit of Peter J. Johnson. Unfortuna~ely,

e mediation was

!
i

I

I

i
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I

unsuccessful. To date, Mr. Krinitt has never submitted the medical evide~~· S, e Affidavit of Peter
J. Johnson.

IDFG then filed a motion seeking dismissal on the basis of statutoJ em oyer immunity. As
thoroughly discussed and analyzed by the Court, the Idaho Supreme 4ourt ermits a statutory
i

employer immunity defense to be raised at any time before trial, provided
I

adverse.party has

I
;

adequate time to respond, which in this case it d.id. Although the Court properly anted this motion,
I

!

it assessed fees and costs from January 31, 2014, based upon its analysis

thrt ID G had not filed this
!

dispositive motion before January 31, 2014. Under the facts and circumstance of this case, IDFG
I

i
I

.

•

respectfully submits that the Court's application ofl.R.C.P. 16(i) is inapprop

!

II. ARGUMENT

There are no cases that have addressed this particular situation. Thelawar ing ofattorney fees

!

in Idaho is dependent upon a statute or rule of the court permitting the awardin
I
i

Power Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Com'n, 102 Idaho 744, 639

P.2f 44

(1981); .Hellar v.

Cenarrusa. 106 Idaho 571> 682 P.2d 524 (1984). The Court ruled that Sfinctio were appropriate
!
I

pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(i) because there was a faiJure by IDFG to comply

¥th

e initial scheduling

order, although the failure was not intentional. However, IDFG in goo~ fai
motions which it felt were dispositive of the merits of the case-both of Jhich

re granted. IDFG

i

i

acknowledges that it did not consider a dispositive motion based on the st$tory mployerimmunity

i

at that time through an oversight.

I

l

The Idaho Supreme Court has not imposed any restrictions on iitikg a otion asserting the
I
i
I

statutory employer immunity defense which could serve as a basis for 1.1}-C.P 16(i) sanctions:
I

[T]his Court has held that an affinnative defense may be raised ftjr the 1rst time on
a motion for summary judgment. ... Though we noted an affirmati~e de ense cannot
i

i

I J
I
i
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be raised for the first time on appeal, we held "that where the defens was raised
before trial and the defendant was given time to present argument jn op osition, the
defense ... can be raised for the first time in the summary judgme~t mo on." Id. · ·
iI

... Thus, the Bluestone requirement that "the defendant was given . to present
argument in opposition" was met. Appellants were alerted to the~ "ty defense
by the Memorandum accompanying the State's Motion for Summ!ll)' J dgment and
had time to respond and present their opposing argument.
I

i

Therefore, we hold srunmary judgment was proper and that the siate d d not waive
its affirmative defense of immunity.
j
·

Fuhriman v. State, Dep't ofTransp., 143 Idaho 800, 803-04, 153 P.3d 480 (2 07).
!
In addition, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure pennit any PartY to ove for summary
!
i

judgment on all or part of a claim:

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule56(b). Swnmnry Judgm~n~ -Fo Defending
Party.
I
·
I

A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross~claim! is
declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or w.;_tho supporting
affidavits for a summacy judgment in that party's favor as to all ot any art thereof.
Ptovided, a motion for summacy judgment must be filed at least 9,0 da: s before the
trial date, or filed within 7 days from the date of the order setting the e for trial,
whichever is later, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
I
1

I.R.C.P. 56(b).

After mediation failed, IDFG properly submitted its motion for s ~

judgme~t as to the

I

I

statutory immunity issue approximately seven months before the new tri~ da
I

IIL CONCLUSION

I
i

As the Court and Plaintiffs counsel recognized, there was no int91-tion or bad faith intent
I

on the part of IDFG. IDFG does not take issue with the Court's analysis oflits di cretion with respect

I
.
to the application ofI.R.C.P. l 6(i). However, IDFG respectfully submits \that i application to this
I

case is inappropriate. IDFG had timely and successfully sought dis~sals f the claims which
I

i

i

I
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''

resulted in the vacating of any pretrial scheduling orders. Subsequently., the ~up:z; e Court disagreed
i
with the dismissal ofMr. Krinitt' s claims and remanded the case for further pro eedings. Even after
I

.

I

IDFG recognized that a dismissal might also be obtained under the statutoty e

loyer immunity, it

I

voluntarily attempted in good faith to resolve the case through mekatio . When .this was
I
I

I

unsuccessful, it sought the present relief.

!

IDFG understands the Plaintiffs counsel will be submitting a re~uest for fees and costs,

i

which will likely be filed contemporaneously with IDFG' s motion to modify the ·smissal order and
I
i

d costs request in

judgment. IDFG respectfully request the opportunity to address Plaintiff, fees
a subsequent pleading.

DATED:

June 13, 2016.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

!

!

I hereby certify that on this / j day of June, 2016, I caused to be serv~d a

py of the foregoing

by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:
[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
J?<}..Facsimile
[ ] Federal Express

Charles H. Carpenter
Carpent.er Law Firm, PLC
210 N. Higgins Avenue) Suite 336
Missoula, MT 59802
Phone: (406) 543-0511
Fax:
(406) 258-0365
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;
I

I
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i

i

i
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i

I

I hereby certify that on this / j day of June, 2016, I caused to be serv~d a c py of the :foregoing
'

!

by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:
Charles H. Ca:rpenter
Carpenter Law Firm, PLC
210 N. Higgins A venue, Suite 336
:M:issoula, MT 59802
Phone: (406)543-0511

Fax:

.

!
i
II

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery

I

i
I

i

-H' Facsimile

[ ] Federal Express

(406) 258-0365

.i
i

!

!

i

I
j

,
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Lew}s County District Court

· , J=ILED

J!r'.!Jilib,cwcKJlM

Charles H. Carpenter
Idaho Bar No. 8322
Carpenter Law Firm plc
210 N. Higgins Avenue Suite 336
Missoula, Montana 59802
(406) 543-0511

JUN 1 6 2016

cawentc@cai:penrerlawfirmplc,com
Attornryfar Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
LEWIS COUNTY
PERRY KRINITT
Plaintiff,

v.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ft1SH .AND GAME, and
STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. CV 12-146

VEIUFIED MEMORANDUM
OF COSTS & ATI"ORNEYS FEES

---------~-)
State of Montann

County of Missoula

)
)ss
)

Charles H. Carpenter, being duly sworn on his oath, deposes and states as
follows:
1.

I am the attorney for the Plaintiff in this action, and submit this
memorandum of cost.~ and attorney's fees pursuant to the Coures order
ofJune 1, 2016.

00 88

Jun.14.2016

03:08

2.

Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter

4067217364

PAGE.

As noted in that Order, Plaintiff incutted considerable expenses and
attomets fees in this action between January 31, 2014 and June 1, 2016.
Attached hereto is a summary of time and costs incurred between those

dates.
3.

Attorney's fees in the summary are calculated at standard hourly rates:
$280.00 for Charles Carpenter, $400 for John Sullivan. I have been lend
counsel throughout the case. Mr. Sullivan assisted the dient in
ptcparati011 for, and during, the recent mediation. l hnvc been practicing
law since 1991. Mr. Sullivan practices in Orange County, California, and
has been practicing since 1975. He has very extensive experie11ce in
media.ting personal injury cases.

4.

Plaintiff employed three experts during the time peii.od covered by this
memorandum. Douglas Stimpson of Accident Investigation &
Reconstruction, is Plaintiffs principle expert on liability issues. Larry
Grandy, of Air Methods Corporation, serves a.s Plainriffs rebuttal expert
011 liability. Bath have extensive experience, and thttlr <.1ua.lifications are
in the record of the case. In addition, throughout the case, Plaintiff has
employed a non-testifying cxpet:t, Richard McPherson of DownRange
Global Solutions, to advise him and counsel on technical issues. His
time in this memorandum refates exclusively to his work in connection
with the 2014 Motiott for Summary Judgment, and the expert
depositions taken in March 2014. Fees for all three experts are based on
their standard rates.

5.

With respect to costs, the State of Idaho has already paid costs as
ordered by the Idaho Supreme Court, of $1273.65. This amount should
be deducted from the award given at this stage.

6.

As seen in the summary, fees and costs break down as follows:

Attomey's Fees
John Sullivan:

$3,400.00

$55,174.20
Amber Lamb (paralegal): $1,104.00
Charles Carpenter:

$60,218.20

Subtotal:
Expert Fees
Stimpsm1:

$9,969.50
2

00 89
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Jun.14.2016

03:09

Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter

G111ndy:
McPherson:

$3,586.00
$6,631.84

Subtotal:

$20,187.34

Mediator:
Reinhardt:

$2,195.00

Other Charges:

$10,614.28

Total:
7.

4067217364

PAGE.

$93,214.82

My paralegal Amber Lamb and I have both spent 5ubstantially more
time on the matter than is shown on the summa.ry attached. In addition
to the costs listed above ~ which ate passed through the client- I incurred
consi<lei:ahle costs for automated legal research. Because it is not my
practice to bill clients for such costs, I have not included them here. I
tcgarcl such costs as a part of my standatd hourly rate.

DATED this 141h day of June, 2016.
Respectfully~;;?
,,//
/

_.,......-

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO

before me this /'1-4·"'1 day ofJune> 2016

~0,(~
NOTARY PUBJ JC
FAANKR
NOTARY PUBLIC for the

State of Montana
Residing at Mts:ioula, MT
My Commission Expires
June 16, 2019.

3

0 0 :. n
\.)

'~

--

---
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify on the 141h day of June, 2016, I served the foregoing by mailing,
by fax and by email to:
Peter J..J ohmion
JOHNSON LAW GROUP
103 E. Indiana, Suite A

Spokane, WA 99207-2317

4
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Charles H. Carpenter
210 N. Higgins Avenue
Higgins Building, Suite 336
Missoula, MT 59802

Invoice submitted to:

June 14, 2016
Invoice #481

Professional Services

2/1/2014 Revised Defendant's Motion- cases cited

Hrs/Ra~g

Amount

2.30

644.00

280.00/hr

2/2/2014 Email conference with P. Johnson re: expert deposition

0.20

56.00

280.00/hr

2/8/2014 Grandy: Reviewed summery judgment. attachments

2/9/2014 Conference with L. Grandy re: oppO$ltlon

1.50
220.00/hr

330.00

0.40

112.00

280.00/hr

Grandy: file transfer and phone conference with C. Carpenter

1.00

220.00

220.00/hr
2/10/2014 Conference with Johnison's offflCG re: dapoaitions

0.40

112.00

280.00/hr
Accident Investigation and Reconstruction"" Review major/ minor maintenance
and alterations, regs and installation
2/14/2014 Rlehard McPherson- Document reviews and disc from Peter Johnson

4.40
285.00/hr

1,254.00

6.00

1,271.28

211.88/hr

Accident Investigation and Reconstruction- Review Hiller UH~12E cabin and
cockpit p~yout and accident Info.
2/15/2014 Reviewed Sommers file

4.60
1.30

280.00/hr

0 U' ('~ (..-.

1,311.00

266.00/hr
364.00

Jun.14.2016

03:10

Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter

4067217364
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Page

Hrit/Rat~

2/18/2014 Conference with D. Stimpson re: deposition
Fax to P. Krinltt re: schedule. strategy

7/ 20

2

Amoynt

0.20
280.00/hr

56.00

0.50

140.00

280.00/hr

Conference with R. McPherson re: damages, exhibits

1.00
280.00/hr

280.00

2/2212014 Richard McPherson- Letter from Amber with discs of Sommers file to review In
dance of Depos etc.

5.30
211.88/hr

1,122.96

2/24/2014 Prepared draft witness 11st

1.30
280.00/hr

364.00

Conference with E. Knowles re: deposition

0.30
280.00/hr

84.00

Reviewed faxes from P. Krinitt re: strategy 1 schedule

0.50
280.00/hr

140.00

0.80
280.00/hr

224.00

0.30

84.00

0.80
280.00/hr

224.00

0.20

56.00

2/26/2014 Reviewed E. Knowles file in preparation for deposition
Conference with P. Krinitt re: schedule, depositions

280.00/hr

Conference with D. Schoeggl re: securing evidence
Conference with P. Johnson re: depositions

280.00/hr
2/27/2014 Prepared memorandum to P. Krinitt re: schedule, strategic concerns
Emal!

conference with P. Johnson re: deposition aehedullng

1.70
280.00/hr

476.00

0.10

28.00

280.00/hr

Accident Investigation and Reconstruction-- Phone call, review and analysis of
file

0.90
255.00/hr

229.50

4.50
285.00/hr

1,282.50

3/1/2014 Memo to P. Krlnltt re: strategy

0.60
280.00/hr

168.00

3/3/2014 Conference with Johnson re: depositions, mediation

0.20
280.00/hr

56.00

2/28/2014 Accident Investigation and Reconstruction-· Research time, distance, and
performance for accident flight

00 93

Jun.14.2016

03:10
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3/3/2014 Accident Investigation and Reconstruction- review file
Accident Investigation and Reconstruction-~ research and review technical data

8/ 20

3

A!IlQUnt

1.00
255.00/hr

255.00

$.00

858.00

220.00/hr
3/4/2014 Prepared for depositions

3/6/2014 conference with P. Johnson re: mediation, schedule

1.70
280.00/hr

476.00

0.20

56.00

280.00/hr
317/2014 Accident Investigation and Reconstruction - research and review technical data/
copy additional photo and documents and send to Peter Johnson
3/9/2014 Prepared for deposition, travel
3/10/2014 M<Jeting with R. McPherson re: expert reports; meeting with 0. Stimson

3.30

726.00

220.00/hr
4.20
280.00/hr

1,176.00

5.80

1,624.00

4.00
211.88/hr

847.52

3.30

841.50

280.00/hr
Richard McPherson- Reviewing with Doug Stimpson
Accident Investigation and Reconstruction -- conferences, phone calls and
review file

255.00/hr

Accident Investigation and Reconstruction -- research and review technical data,
deposition preparation and assistance

220.00/hr

Accident Investigation and Reconstruction - meetings and deposition prep

2.90

638.00

4.50

1,262.50

8.30
280.00/hr

2,324.00

8.00

1,6i:l5.04

285.001hr
3/11/2014 Depositions of Somers and Stimson; conference with R. McPherson and P.
Krinitt
Richard McPherson- Sommers :;ind Stimpson Depositions Johnson "I heard

Charlie was bringing his handyman"

211.88/hr

Accident Investigation and Reconstruction - phone calls and conference

0.70
255.00/hr

178.50

1.10

242.00

1.00
280.00/hr

280.00

4.00

847.52

Accident Investigation and Reconstruction -- research and review technical data/
deposition preparation and assistance
3/-12/2014 Rttvittwed, r•viaed witness list
Richard McPherson- Notes and updates

220.00/hr

211.88/hr

00 9&

Jun.14.2016

03:11
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Page
Hrs/f{§tffl

3/13/2014 Grandy- Phone conference with C. Carpenter
3/16/2014 Conference with E. Knowles re: schedule

9/ 20

4

Amount

0.90
220.00/hr

198.00

0.10

28.00

280.001hr
3/20/2014 Conference with D. Schoeggl re: Pope testimony

0.30
280.00/hr

84.00

3/22/2014 Draft oppoaition brief

1.00
280.00/hr

280.00

3/.23/2014 Grandy- Prepared affidavit; reviewed record

5.00
220.00/hr

1,100.00

3/25/2014 Reviewed Grandy affidavit; conference with L. Grandy

0.80
280.00/hr

224.00

3/27/2014 Revised draft brief; reviesed deposition transcripts

3,90
280.001hr

1,092.00

3/28/2014 Grandy- Phone conference with C. Carpenter

0.40
220.00/hr

88.00

3/30/2014 Grandy- Reviewed depositions and exhibits

3.20
220.00/hr

704.00

3/31/2014 Grandy- Revised affidavit, reviewed record

4.30
220.00/hr

946.00

2.80
220.00/hr

616.00

0.40

112.00

Accident Investigation and Reconstruction .. research and review Spokane time
and date audio
4/1/2014 Scheduling conference, confrence with P. Krinltt

280.00/hr
4/312014 Reviewed Stimpson affidavit

0.20

58.00

280.00/hr
A, Lamb Formatted Grandy affidavit

4/7/2014 Revised Draft opposition brief

0.40
60.00/hr

2.30

24.00

644.00

280.00/hr
4/8/2014 Revised Draft opposition brief
Richard McPherson- Review Colin Sommers Deposition

1.40
280.00/hr

392.00

6.50
211,88/hr

1,377.22

Jun.14.2016

03:11
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4/10/2014 A. Lamb-Assembled exhibits to opposition
4/11/2014 Finalized, filed opposition bri8f

5

Amoy!Jt

2.70
60.00/hr

162.00

1.70

476.00

280.00/hr

A. Lamb- Finalized opposition brief
4/15/2014 Conference with J. Spencer re: exhibit errors

2.10
60.00/hr

128.00

0.20

56.00

280.00/hr
4/16/2014 Reviewed Johnson errata
4/18/2014 Corrected exhibits

0.20
280.00/hr

56.00

0.50

140.00

280.00/hr
5/1/2014 Conference with P. John$On re: mediation

0.10

28.00

5/5/2014 Scheduling conference on motion for summary judgment

0.30
280.00/hr

84.00

5/9/2014 Reviewed reply brief, motion to strike; cases cited

2.40
280.00/hr

672.00

5/18/2014 Draft opposition to motion

2.00
280.00/hr

560.00

5/19/2014 Revised draft opposition to motion to strike

3.10
280.00/hr

868.00

5/20/2014 Finalized draft opposition

1.10
280.00/hr

308.00

0.50

127.60

280.00/hr

Accident investigation and Reconstruetlon •• phone call,

255.00/hr
5/22/2014 Reviewed Krinitt notes on briefs: conference with P. Krlnltt re: argument

1.20
280.00/hr

336.00

5/29/2014 Hearing preparation, travel to Karmiah

4.30
280.00/hr

1,204.00

5/30/2014 Hearing; conference with P. Krlnltt re: hearing; conference with P. Johnson re:
settlement; travel

6.20
280.00/hr

1,736.00

0.20
280.00/hr

56.00

6/4/2014 Conference with P. Johnson re: mediation

00 98

Jun.14.2016

03:12
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11/

6

Amoynt

6/16/2014 Conference with P. Johnson and T. Rabun re: mediation

0.30
280.00/hr

84.00

6/17/2014 Email oxchange with P. Johnson re: mediation

0.20
280.00/hr

56.00

6/26/2014 Conference with P. Johnson re: potential deposition dates

0.20
280.00/hr

56.00

1.80

504.00

7/9/2014 Reviewed ruling; conference with P. Krinitt re: ruling, strategy

280.00/hr
7/28/2014 Draft notice of appeal

0.40

112.00

280.00/hr
A. Lamb- filled In parts of notice of appeal

0.80

48.00

7/30/2014 conference with P. Krlnltt re: strategy

0.50
280.00/hr

140.00

8/1/2014 A. Lamb- Reviewed notice of appeal

0.30
60.00/hr

18.00

Revi&wed notice of appeal

0.40
2ao.OO/hr

112.00

0.30

18.00

60.00/hr

8/4/2014 A. Lamb· Reviewed documents to be designated to calculate fees

60.00/hr
8/6/2014 Conference with P. Krinitt re: appeal Issues

0.30

84.00

280.00/hr
8/8/2014 A. Lamb- Conference with N. Kinzer re: fees and record Issues

Flnallzed, fllect notice or appeal

0.20
60,00/hr

12.00

0.30

84.00

280.001hr

8/19/2014 Conference with P. Krinltt re: appeal issues
8/22/2014 Reviewed dismissed order

0.50
280.00/hr

140.00

0.20

56.00

280.00/hr
8/25/2014 Prepared motion for revised final judgment; draft order
9/4/2014 Conference With N. Kinzer re: revised Judgment

00 97

0.40
280.00/hr

112.00

0.10
280.00/hr

28.00

20
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Page

l;lrs/Rate

7

Amount

9/5/2014 Reviewed revised final judgment

0.10
280.001hr

28.00

9/9/2014 Finalized. filed amended notice of appeal

0.20
280.00/hr

56.00

0.10

28.00

0.50

30.00

10/14/2014 Reviewed request for additional documents

280.00/hr
10/20/2014 A. Lamb,. Prepared request to add documents to record

60.00/hr
Reviewed request

0.20

56.00

280.00/hr
10/27/2014 Prepared, filed objection, notice re: record

0.30

84.00

280.00/hr
0.20

10/29/2014 A. Lamb- Prepared proposed order

12.00

60.00/hr

0.20
280.00/hr

58.00

10/30/2014 Revised proposed order; shared draft with P. Johnson

0.20
280.00/hr

56.00

11/10/2014 Reviewed record notice, due date; confetence with P. Krinitt

0.30
280.00/hr

84.00

2.70

756.00

Hearing on record Issues

11/16/2014 Research re: appeal Issues

280.00/hr

11/20/2014 Research re: opening brief
A. Lamb- assembled record

11/23/2014 Draft summary judgment brief

3.10
280.00/hr

868.00

1.30
60.00/hr

78.00

1.70

476.00

280.00/hr

11/28/2014 Revieed draft brief; email exchange with N, Kinzer re: record

3.70
280.00/hr

1,036.00

11/28/2014 Revised appeal brief

3.50
280.00/hr

980.00

12/1/2014 Revised draft brief

2.10
2ao.OO/hr

588.00

00 9. p_J

Jun.14.2016

03:12

Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter

4067217364

PAGE. 13/ 20

Page

12/4/2014 Revised brief

8

clC§LB~~

8WQ!.!!l1

4.00

1,120.00

280.00/hr

12/5/2014 A Lamb prepared brief, record
Reviewed brief
12/8/2014 Finalized, filed brief; draft, flied motion to argument

A. Lamb Finalized brief
12/11/2014 Reviewed email from P. Johnson re: extnsion; conference with P. Krlnitt

2.60
60.00/hr

150.00

1.70
280.00/hr

476.00

1.60
280.00/hr

448.00

3.20
60.001hr

192.00

0.20

56.00

280.00/hr

'12/16/2014 RttviHwtit.l order on extension
1/29/2015 Conference with P. Johnson re: augmenting record; extending time for reply

0.10
280.00/hr

26.00

0.20

56.00

280.00/hr
2/2/2015 Reviewed motion to augment; attachments

0.50

140.00

280.00/hr

2/4/2015 Conference with P. Johnson re: errors in brief; revised F&G brief, cases cited

2.80

784.00

280.00/hr
2/6/2015 Draft motion to extend time

0.20
280.00/hr

56.00

2/9/2015 Finalized motion to extend time

0.10
280.00/hr

28.00

0.10

28.00

2/13/2015 Reviewed order and motion to extend time

280.00/hr
2/27/2015 Research re: reply brief

1.90
280.00/hr

532.00

2/28/201 s Research re: reply brlet. reviewed record

2.10
280.00/hr

586.00

3/4/2015 Draft reply brief; revised record

3.60
280.00/hr

1,008.00

3/5/2015 Draft reply brief

2.80
280.00/hr

784.00

oo 9a

Jun.14.2016

03:13
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Page

3/6/2015 Revised draft reply brief

9

t:l!JLBii!~

Amount

1.90

532.00

280.00/hr

3/8/2015 Revised draft brief

2.10
280.00/hr

688.00

3/9/2015 Revised brief; email exchange with P. Johnson re: omitted a>chlbit

1.40
280.00/hr

392.00

0.20
280.00/hr

56.00

A. Lamb- Draft motion to add documents to record

0.50
60.00/hr

30.00

3/11/2015 A. Lamb- Flied motion to argument; filed reply brief

1.20
60.00/hr

72.00

3/20/201 G Reviewed order on record

0.10
280.00/hr

28.00

3/23/2015 Reviewed order on retention

0.10
280.00/hr

28.00

4/30/2015 Reviewed order retaining case; conference with P. Krinitt

0.20
280.00/hr

56.00

5/13/2015 Reviewed notice re: hearing date; email exchange with P. Johnson regarding
schedule

0.30
280.00/hr

84.00

5/14/2016 Responded to hearing notice

0.10
280.001hr

28.00

0.20
280.001hr

56.00

0.30
280.00/hr

84.00

0.20

12.00

3/10/2015 Conference with N. Kinzer re: exhibits; conference with A. Lamb re: motion

6/9/2015 Reviewed order setting case; responded to order; reviewed amended order;

responded to amended order
6/15/2015 Conference with c. Schoeggl, P. Krlnltt regarding storage of evidence
8/17/2015 Conference with K. Lehnnan at Supreme Court re: filing

60.00/hr
8/26/2015 Reviewed briefs and cases cited In briefs in preparation for oral argument
8/27/2015 Travel to Moscow; prepare for oral argument

4.70
280.00/hr

1,316.00

7.20

2,016.00

280.00/hr
8/28/2015 Oral argument; conference with P. Johnson re: settlement; conference with P.
Krinitt re: hearing, settlement; travel

0 0 .~ Ci 0

5.30
280.00/hr

1,484.00

Jun.14.2016

03:13
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9/24/2015 Reviewed notice of decision

Hfl/Bal~

Amouot

0.10

28.00

280.00/hr
9/25/2015 Reviewed decision; conference with P. Krinitt

10

1.20

336.00

280.00/hr
10/2/2015 Draft memo to P. Krlnitt re: settlement strategy: legal issues

1.30

364.00

280.00/hr
10/8/2015 Research re: memorandum of costs

1.80
280.00/hr

504.00

10/9/2015 Finalized, flied memorandum of costs

0.40
280.00/hr

112.00

1.10

66.00

A. Lamb research re: memorandum of costs

60.00/hr
10/'16/20'15 A. Lamb prepared lirnt:1111.lt:11.l 1111::1111u1c1ndum of cost&

0.30

60.00/hr
10/19/2015 A. Lamb Conference with S. Velasquez at Supreme Court re: costs; conference

with C. Carpenter re: corrected memo
11/4/2015 Conference withs. Nutsch re: potential mediators; memo to P. Krinitt re:
potenttal mediators

0.40
60.00/hr

24.00

0.40

112.00

280.00/hr

0.10

11/9/2015 Revised scheduling order

18.00

28.00

280.00/hr
11/16/2015 Email exchange with P. Johnson re: mediation

0.10
280.00/hr

28.00

11/17/2015 Email exchange with P. Johnson re: mediation

0.20
280.00/hr

56.00

0.80

224.00

11/19/2015 Scheduling conference with Judge Fitzmaurice; conference with P. Krinitt

280.00/hr
11/20/2015 Reviewed form scheduling order

0.20
280.00/hr

56.00

12/15/2015 Reviewed Johnson letter re: mediators

0.20
280.00/hr

56.00

0.40

24.00

12/22/201ij A. Lamb gathered information re: mediators

60.00/hr

0.40
280.00/hr

12/23/2015 Draft letter to Judge Fitzmaurice re: mediators

0010)

112.00

Jun.14.2016

03:14
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Page

H[§/R§!ll
12/30/2015 email exchange with N. Kinzer, P. Johnson re: schedule

1/13/2016 Conference with Judge Fitzmaurice: call with P. Krinitt

11

AmQll.lJ.t

0.10
280.00/hr

28.00

0.80

224.00

280.00/hr

1/14/2016 Conference with P. Johnson re: mediation, venue

0.50

280.00/hr

140.00

1/15/2016 Conference with P. Johnson re: mediation

0.30
280.00/hr

84.00

1/21/2016 Conference with P. Krlnltt re: legal Issues, strategy

0.80
280.00/hr

224.00

1122/2016 Conference with P. Krinltt re: legal issues, strategy

0.70
280.00/hr

196.00

1/26/2018 email exchange with P. Johnson re: arrangements for mediation

0.20
280.001hr

56.00

1/28/2016 email exchange with P. Johnson re: mediation arrangements

0.20
280.00/hr

56.00

1/31/2016 Memo to P. Krinitt re: mediation, strategy

0.80
280.001hr

224.00

2/3/2016 Email conference with Judge Reinhardt

0.20
280.00/hr

56.00

1.10

308.00

2/11/2016 Conference with P. Krinitt, reviewed faxes re: mediation strategy

280.00/hr
2/12/2016 Conference with A. Lamb re: travel arrangements

0.20

56.00

280.001hr

2/19/2016 Draft mediation statement

1.70
280.00/hr

476.00

2/25/2016 Conference with P. Krlnltt re: Mediation statement

0.80
280.00/hr

224.00

2/26/2016 Finalized draft mediation statement

1,10
280.00/hr

308.00

2/29/2016 Reinhardt - Reviewed statements

1.35
200.00/hr

270.00

1.00

200.00

3/1/2016 Reinhardt-- Reviewed statements

200.00/hr

Jun.14.2016

03:14
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Hrs/Rate

12

Amount

3/1/2016 John Sullivan: Conference with client re: strategy; reviewed documents

1.50
400.00/hr

600.00

3/2/2018 Travel to mediation; mediation, conference with counsel; counsel with P. Krinitt

8.70
280.00/hr

2,436.00

Mediation Session

2.00
200.00/hr

400.00

Travel to Mediation

6.75
100.00/hr

675.00

Travel to Boise

6.50
100.001hr

650,00

John Sullivan: Mediation, client conference; travel to and from mediation site.

7.00
400.00/hr

2,800.00

4.80

1,344.00

in advance and after mediation

3/3/2016 Travel from mediation; research re: immunity

280.00/hr
3/8/2016 Preparation for mediation
3/10/2016 Research re: immunity defense

1.50
280.00/hr

420.00

2.70

756.00

280.00/hr

3/12/2016 Research re: waiver, immunity, revised record

1.70
280.00/hr

476.00

3/14/2016 Draft memo on immunity, waiver

2.80
280.00/hr

784.00

3/19/2016 Reviewed motion for summary judgment

2.30
260.00/hr

644.00

1.40

392.00

Draft brief 111 opposition

280.00/hr
1.30
280.00/hr

364.00

4/12/2016 Revised draft opposition brief

1.50
280.00/hr

420.00

4/13/2016 Finalized; filed opposition brief

2.10
280.00/hr

688.00

4/25/2016 Revised reply brief, cases oited therein

2.10
280.00/h(

588.00

4/1/2016 Revised draft brief

00103

Jun.14.2016

03:14
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!::11:§lBa~
4/29/201G Reviewed reply brief

13

8ID2!.!Dl

0.90
280.00/hr

252.00

5/1/2016 Travel, hearing preparation

4.20
280.00/hr

1,17e.oo

5/2/2016 Hearing, conference with P. Johnson re; settlement; travel

4.80
280.00/hr

1,288.00

For professional services rendered

330.70

$82,600.54

Additional Charges :
12/8/2013 Service

54.94

Coples

120.92

3/3/2014 Accident Investigation and Reconstruction, Inc.- Copying cost
3/7/2014 Copies

566.87
47.50

642.00

Flights and lodging in Denver
Ground Transportation

50.00

Aooidtml Investigation and Reconstruction, Inc.-- FedEx

68.62

3/9/2014 Richard McPherson-Airfare Lodging, Per Diem. Expenses. Ground Transportation

900.00

3/10/2014 Coples

63.30

3/11/2014 Deposition Transcripts

93.89

3/12/2014 Meals In Denver

115.00
50.00

Ground transportation

62.50

3/29/2014 Hotel

Mileage

83.80

3/30/2014 Mileage

108.90
40.00

4/4/2014 Grandy- Delivery

60.92

3/11/2015 copies

51.85

c1elivery

00104

Jun.14.2016
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14

Amount
3/17/2015 Fee for added documents

48.00

Copies

68.40

t!/27/2015 Mileage

138.10

Meals

40.18

Hotel

115.68

8/28/2015 Mileage

158.10

Meals

26.50

3/2/2016 Airfare- Carpenter

251.55

Airfarew Reinhardt

762.46

Hotel Carpenter and Reinhardt

210.92

Ground Travel

26.50

Meal Mediation

103.07

Travel to Mediation

39.64

5/1/2016 Lodging, dinner

107.50

Travel Expense

93.25

5/2/2016 Travel Expense

93.20

6/10/2016 Appeal Fee

1,292.00

6/14/2016 Transcript Cost

100.00

Helicopter Storage (Oue In July 2010)

0,752.00

6.44

Copy CD of transmission

Total additional charges

$10,614.28

Total amount of this bill

$93,214.82

Balance due

$93,214.82

00105
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Charles H. Carpenter
Totals Only Worksheet

6/14/2016
3:51 PM
Client
Last bill
Last charge
Krinitt (Bill Of Cost)

6/14/2016
481

Page

Billable:
Fees
Costs
Hours

Un billable:
Fees
Costs
l:!ours

Interest
Fin charge
Tax fees

82600.54
10614.28
330.70

0.00
0.00
0.00

Tax costs

Payments
Credits
Wrt offs
Refunds

Prior bal
New charges
NewNR
Ne~bal

0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00

0.00
93214.82
0.00

0.00

93214.62

0.00

0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00

0.00
93214.82
0.00

0.00

93214.82

0.00

0.00
Grand Total

82600.64
10614.28
330.70

o.oo

0.00
0.00

1

OulClB

o.oo
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LAW OFFICES
;

.

I

i

i
I

PE'IER J. JOHNSON, ISB # 4105
Johnson Law Group
103 E. Indiana, Suite A
Spokane, WA 99207-2317
Phone: (509) 835-5000

Fax:

I

B

I

iI
I

I
I

(509)326-7503

Attorneys for Defendants
11

II
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TijE'SECOND JUDICIAL JI$TR1

91f
LE
I .

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY
.

i

PERRYlCRJNrIT,

I

Plaintiff,

V.

NO. CV 12-146

OF THE
S

I

l

11

DEFENDANTS' ¥IDTIO TO
DISALLOW A PQRfI'IO OF
PLAINTIFF'S COSTS
ATTORNEY

IDAHODEPARTMENTOFflSHAND
GAME and STATE OF IDAHO,

II

FEES
[Oral Argument R~quest

Defendants.

t

I
I
I. I,

Defendants (hereinafter "IDFG"), by and through their auomet

rec rd, Peter J. Jolm on

rd

of Johnson Law Group, respectfully move the Court to disallow a poion of Plaintiffs costs
! I
attorney fees. This motion is based upon the memorandum of authorities! and t e file and pleadings

·

I

herein.
DATED:

June 20, 2016.

/

•.

J

·

l

I
I
!

1 1

I
I

II

JOHNSON LAW G~qUP

lI
I

I
I

I

II

i

I

!t(S

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISALLOW cosrs - l

!, II
!

00107

'

I

'

SON LAW GROUP
103 a lndwia, Suite A

I

pokane. WA 99207-23117
) 83S-500D FAX: (509~ 326-7503

i

I
I

I

I!
;

LAW OFFICES

PAGE

I

05/12

1,
I

II
I

CERTIFICATE OF SERYJC~

I hereby certify that on this 20 day of June, 2016, I caused to be sehikJ a
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL :qI~TRI

T OF TIIB
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y O · LE S

i
I

I
I

PERRY KRINITT,

I

NO. CV 12-14r
Plaintiff,

i

'

DEFENDANUS" :tv.IE ORANDUM
SUPPORT 0~ ~on N TO

V.

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND
GAlv.tE and STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendants.

DISALLOW ~ T
PLA1NTIFF'S ~UB
AND AITORf'fYS
I

OF

D COSTS
ES .

f
I

[Oral Argume~t equ sted]

I!
Defendants (hereinafter "IDFG") reopectfully move this Court )o

la1

w certain costs nd

I

l.R.C.P. 16(!) pem,its the Court to assess reasonable expenses
the cucum,tance, enumerated therein and con,istent with Idaho

required Plaintiff to file a memorandum of costs and attorney fees

I

J+lud attorney fees

1.wj

r

t
I

!I I

attorney fees submitted by Plaintiff.

its decision. the

un er

I

pr' uant to I.R.C.P. 54. fe

Court indicated it would then consider all expenses and fees incurred ~y plain 'ff after January ~l,
.

I

I

I

Ii

J

I
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I.R.C.P. 54(a)(l) provides that a court may award reasonable at~opiey ees to the prevailing .
party. The Plaintiff is not the prevailing party in this matter. Non~eless whether the

proceeds under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) or I.R.C.P. 16(1), the guideline must

Uthe
!I

cL

asonableness offhe

fees and expenses. Although IDFG respectfully submits that the Court' kdecisi n awarding fees nd

!I
ttline
motion
Plrttiff re not reasonabl or

costs since January 31, 2014, is not appropriate for the reasons

reconsideration, IDFG submits that the fees and costs requested by

in the

or

appropriate and therefore objects to certain of the fees and costs conW:ned i Plaintiff's ''verif ed

II ,I

memorandum of costs and attorney fees."
It is !DFG' s belief that Plaintiff's counseli, on a contingent

ft tsi,.

While this fact d "'

not preclude an assessment of reasonable fees under Idaho law, the asrlsme t should not prov de

I

Plaintiff with a windfall when he is not the preventing party. That dayI,
I ,
requests similar to the categories outlined in Plaintiffs memorandum. ! I

A

j

Attorney Fees
1.

G will address he

I

I

i!

John Sullivan

The plaintiff seeks attorney fees for John Sullivan of $3,400.

/Ffst,

ere is no proof that

Plaintiff incurred any such fee, Second, Mr. Sullivan is not an

attamH of r cord nor to IDPf',

knowledge i, he licen,ed to practice Jaw in the State of Idaho.

Thlrd,1i1 app

limited to the Court~ordered mediation, which IDFG agreed to attend in

time and rate are wrreasonable for a mediation that Ja,ted
respectfully requests that the Court disallow this claim.

2.

Charles Carpenter

approfif,atel
!

J

four hours.

ror
j

!I

!

I/
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fort·
i

The Court has discretion to determine a reasonable rate

C

believes the requested rate is high, but will leave it to the Court to set a JJona

II

IDFG does not intend to nitpick each of Mr. Carpenter's entries as the~ r+late

his time on cert ·n

m4'kd

i would consider i ,

portions of the case. IDFG merely wishes to remind the Court thatit

incurred by Plaintiff after January 31, 2014.However> the Court should Jot co sider any time fr m

March 3, 2016, forward. Mr. Carpenter's titne during this period was
motion seeking a dismissal based upon the statutory emplo)'er' s

d+1ted t

addressing JDl'i' s

immtf

e Court 8"'."ted thls

y.

motion but awarded fees and costs based upon its detennination that tills moti n should have bJen
filed on or before January 31, 2014. Without conceding this point,~. C

enter would h

Ive

!

incurred this time in responding to the motion irrespective of whe~ it w s filed. Pursuant to
I

Plaintiffs memorandum, Mr. Carpenter spent 33:9 hours related to

fj mot on. Based upon he
!
I

I

requested hourly fee, attorney Carpenter's total should be reduced $9,f~2.

B.

!

Expert Fees

!

1.

I\

:Mr. Stimpson and Mr. Grandy

IDFG is unable to address the amounts attributable to these expe,rts

no invoices or ti e

records were provided to review nor was any proof of payment subJJtted. n addition, I.R.
I I

54(d)(l)(C)(8)provides that expert costs are limited to $2,000perexpeJuhiess .R.C.P. 54(d)(l) )

1

•pplieo. JDFG respectfully requests that these expenses be limited to t~ o $4,000.
2.

i \
I

Mr. McPherson

I

The plaintiff indicates that Mr. McPherson was a consulting e~pert.
have any basis to assess his cha,ges since he was never disclosed

r

J!

curriculum vitae has not been provided, no invoices or time records hav,

J

\
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1

.

1

of pa)'lllent has been submitted. IDFG submits that this expense of $6

61 I.

c.

I

Expenses
1.

be disallowed

II

Mr. McPherson

J

Any expenses attributable to Mr. McPherson for the trip to DenieJ fort e depositions of Mr.
. I
Stimpson and Mr. Sommer should not be considered. These expenses Hpear o be $900.

2.

Helicopter Sto:i:age

I

/

. I

IDFG does not have any invoice or other accounting upon wffich to roperly analyze t is

II

claim. IDFG submits that these expenses of $3.752.00 be disallowed. I
I

D.

Summary

/
I

11

I

1.

Attorney fees to disallow ($9,402 + $3,400)

2.

Expert witness fees to disallow (Mr. McPherson)

$ 12,892.00

i
i

$ 16,187.3l

11

3.

Expenses to disallow

I
I

Mr. McPherson - $900.00
Helicopter storage-$3,752.00
Total

E.

I

!

Credits

iI

4,652.ob

$

33,73!.j

I

1•
I

In addition, IDFG pm'iously paid costs awarded by the suPrf
$1,273.65. IDFG also paid $1,100 for the time charged by its

$

Co rt in the amoun of

exprlf, Co ·n Sommer, for

deposition taken by Plaintiff counsel because Plaintiff failed to pay

fo\ 1is ti
I'

1
I

e

I

e. (See attached)[

Without waiving its position that the Court should not assess Iany ee:s or costs, IDFG

respectfully requests that the Court set a reasonable rate le<s than $28~

l

ho for Mr. Ca,peJ.,

and that the Court disallow $36,104.99 from Plaintiffs memorandum befo e determining

amount it will consider.

I

DATED:

I

June 20, 2016.

·,

,

I
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Attorney for Deleq

CERTIF1CATE OF SERVICE
f~

I hereby certify that on this 'H day ofJune, 2016, I caused to be
by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:
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Phone: (406)543--0511
Fax:
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Peter J. Johnson
Johnson Law Group
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Attorneyfar Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
LEWIS COUNTY

PERRY KRINITT
Plaintiff,

v.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
FISH AND GAME, and
STATE OF IDAHO,

________
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

)

No. CV 12-146

MEMORANDUM IN

OPPOSITION TO MOTION
TO DISAILOW CERTAIN COSTS

)

)
)

)

Pursuant to the Court's order ofJune 1, 2016, Plaintiff Krinitt filed a verified

memorandum of costs. The Idaho Department of Fish & Game ("Fish & Game")
has objected to a number of these costs. Some of Fish & Game's objections are well
taken and K.rinitt does not dispute them. This opposition is limited to three items in
the motion: D.1 (attorney's fees) D.3(a) (McPherson's travel expenses) and E (a credit

for payment to Mr. Sommer).

Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter

4067217364

PAGE.

With respect to attorney's fees, Fish & Grune makes three objections: it asks
that John Sullivan's work in connection with the mediation be disallowed entirely, and
that Charles Carpenter's rate be reduced, and certain time disallowed. With respect to
Sullivan, Krinitt has limited his claim for costs to the legal work Sullivan did in
connection with the mediation, which took place in Orange County, California.
Carpenter found Sullivan's work to be valuable - see Exhibit A- and Fish & Game
has no basis for claiming that it was not
Krinitt objects to the assertion that Carpenter's standard hourly rate is
unreasonably high. Attached hereto as exhibits B and C are filings made in other
cases by other attorneys, a few years ago, which show Carpenter's rate to be within
the reasonable range. Fish & Game also objects to fees and costs incurred in
connection with its untimely Motion for Summary Judgment, on the grounds that
these fees and costs would still have been incurred if Fish & Game had timely filed its
motion. This is less than half right. Krinitt's counsel, and the Court, spent significant
time and attention on the question whether Fish & Game had waived its statutory

immunity defense by litigating fault all the way to the Supreme Court, blowing every
deadline there was. Obviously this time, like the time arguing over fees, costs and
whether there should be any sanction at all, would not have happened if Fish & Game
had timely filed.
Fish & Grune also objects to the travel costs associated with Richard
McPherson, of Downrange. Mr. McPherson's assistance in connection with Fish &
2

00118
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Game's Motion for Summary Judgment on fault was also valuable - see Exhibit Awhile his other work has not been included in the claim for costs. Fish & Game's
counsel met Mr. McPherson at the depositions in Denver.
Finally, Fish & Grune seeks a credit for the runounts it paid to its expert. The
facts stated by Fish & Grune in connection with this payment are true, but it is not

entitled to a credit. Had Krinitt paid Mr. Sommers' bill, he would have included the
fee in his claim, and Fish & Grune would have to pay it As it is, the item, having
already been paid by Fish & Game, is not included. This should not be a credit,
because it is a wash.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, and in Fish & Game's motion, Krinitt's claim for
costs and fees should be reduced by the amounts set forth in the motion at D.2
($16,187.34) and D.5(6) ($3,772.00) and no further.
DATED this 29th day of June, 2016.
Respectfully ~~tted
.;.,,/·.,··
--··- ..

__...,-··

. ).'.-'/'

,,....-;,

~a-rt;~s
H. Carpenter
(./
I
""

\

.

.

D

3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify on the 29rh day ofJune, 2016, I served the foregoing by mailing,
by fax and by email to:
Peter J. Johnson
JOHNSON LAW GROUP
103 E. Indiana, Suite A

Spokane, WA 99207-2317

4

5

Jun.28.2016

22:08

Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter

Case 3:08-cv-0055L·-JL ?~»-~"D Document 247

4067217364

PAGE.

Filed 02/14, ·- Page 1 of 28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR Tiffi DISTRICT OF IDAHO

KEVIN E. MAYS,
Case No. 3:08-cv-00552-EJL-CWD

Plaintiff,

REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION

v.

TODD STOBIE, MIKE RIGNEY,
DONALD BLAJR, JOHN
HILDERBRAND, JOE
RODRIGUEZ, DALE BUTTREY,
JACK MCGEE, RICHARD SMITH,
GABE RICHARDSON, JACLYN
MARTIN, JAMIE ROMER, JODY
BROWN, JACOB GUNTER, NEZ

PERCE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho, and
the CITY OF LEWISTON, a
municipality incorporated in the State
of Idaho,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
Following a six-day trial, the jury in this case returned a special verdict finding
Defendant Donald Blair liable for using excessive force against Plaintiff Kevin Mays, and
awarded damages in the amount of$1,954.27. (Dkt. 212.) This matter is before the Court

on Plaintiffs Petition for Award of Attorney Fees, (Dkt. 218), in which Plaintiff seeks
attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in the amount of $439,678.26. Defendant Blair
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION -1
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filed an objection to Plaintiffs request for fees. (Dkt. 226.) The Court heard oral
arguments on Plaintiff's petition on December 12, 2011. Having considered the parties'

arguments, briefing, affidavits and other materials submitted in support of or in
opposition to Plaintiffs petition, and for the reasons set forth below, the undersigned will
recommend that the District Judge grant Plaintiffs petition in part and award $84,791.41
in attorney's fees.

BACKGROUND
The facts and procedural history of this case are well known to the parties and the
Court repeats them here only as necessary to resolve the fee petition. Plaintiff Kevin
Mays brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officers Donald
Blair, Mike Rigney, and Todd Stobie of the Lewiston Police Department and Deputies
Joe Rodriguez and John Hildebrand of the Nez Perce County Sheriffs Department for
events that occurred on December 23, 2006. 1 On that date, the Lewiston Police
Department received a call from Angel Harrell (Plaintiff's then girlfriend) who reported
that Plaintiff may be suicidal and possibly in possession of a firearm. In response to the
call, and acting in furtherance of their community care•taking function, Officers Rigney,
Stobie, and Blair, and Deputies Hildebrand and Rodriguez removed Plaintiffs children
from his home-placing them in the custody of Ms. Harrell-and confronted Plaintiff, who
was located near the outskirts of Lewiston.
1

In his original complaint, (Dkt. 1), Plaintiff also named the City of Lewiston and
Nez Perce County as defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 2
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During the confrontation, Plaintiff was forced to the ground, handcuffed, and
searched. The search revealed that Plaintiff was not in possession of a firearm. When
Plaintiff attempted to stand up after the search was complete, which the officers construed
as resistence, one of the officers placed his knee in Plaintiff's back while another pressed
Plaintiff's face into the ground and another used his Taser on Plaintiff. Plaintiff sustained
a laceration on his head and was taken in an ambulance to the hospital. Plaintiff also
received a citation for resisting arrest. After Plaintiff was tried for and acquitted of
resisting arrest, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that he was wrongfully
arrested and that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Plaintiff also pied state law claims, including battery and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
Plaintiffs initial complaint related only to the above incident. He later sought, and
was granted, leave to amend his complaint to include claims in connection with a second
incident that occurred on November 17, 2008, while Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Nez
Perce County Jail on charges unrelated to the first incident. The amended complaint
asserted claims against members of the Nez Perce County Sheriff's Department who
allegedly beat Plaintiff or neglected him during his incarceration. The second incident did
not involve the City of Lewiston or Officers Stobie, Rigney, Mundell, or Blair. In his
motion for leave to amend, Plaintiff argued that, because he suffered head injuries during
both incidents, and "the defendants responsible for the First Incident w[ould] almost

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 3
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certainly blame the defendants responsible for the Second Incident, and vice versa[,] ...
[t]rying the[] incidents separately would create a substantial risk of incurring double,

multiple, or otherwise inconsistent and inequitable [results]." (Mem. in Supp. ofPl. 's Mot.

for Leave to Amend Comp[. at 3, Dkt. 20-2.)2
Plaintiff also attempted to amend his complaint to add claims related to a third
incident that occurred on June 8, 2009, in which Plaintiff allegedly was harassed at his
home by a Lewiston police officer. (Pl. 's Second Mot. to Amend Comp/., Dkt. 44.)
Plaintiff later withdrew his motion to include claims related to the third incident. (Deel. of

Jason Wood re: Mot. to Amend, Dkt. 67.)
Prior to trial, Plaintiff's claims were significantly narrowed. Early in the litigation,
the parties stipulated to the dismissal of Officer Joedy Mundell, (Dkt. 38), and Deputy
Dustin Hibbard. (Dkt. 46.) As a result of dispositive motions, both govern.mental entities
were dismissed, all claims related to the second incident were dismissed, and all other
causes of action were dismissed with the exception of Plaintiffs excessive force claim
related to the first incident. The case proceeded to trial on Plaintiff's excessive force
claim against Officers Stobie. Rigney. and Blair. and Deputies Hilderbrand and
Rodriguez. Officer Stobie was dismissed by the Court as a result of a motion for
judgment as a matter oflaw at the close of Plaintiff's case in chief. (Dkt. 208.)
2

Plaintiff later sought leave to replace fictitiously designated defendants that were
named in the amended complaint with the names of eight employees of Nez Perce
County, all of whom were allegedly involved in the second incident. (Dkt. 71.) The Court
partially granted Plaintiffs motion on December 7, 2010. (Dkt. 99.)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 4
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At the close of the evidence, and after motions were addressed, closing arguments
were made, jury instructions were given, the case was submitted to the jury and the jury

was presented with a special verdict fonn. The special verdict fonn asked the jury to
identify which, if any, of the individual officers and deputies had used excessive force.
(Dkt. 212.) If the jury found any of the defendants had used excessive force, the special

verdict form then asked the jury to identify what damages Plaintiff had suffered and left
spaces open for the jury to fill in the amount of "Medical Expenses," "Other Non
Economic Damages," and "Nominal Damages" as to each individual defendant. (Id.) The
special verdict form also asked the jury to determine whether Plaintiff was entitled to an
award of punitive damages.

Of the remaining four defendants, the jury found that only Officer Blair had used
excessive force and awarded Plaintiff $1,954.27 for medical expenses. (Dkt. 212.) The
Jury also found that Plaintiff was not entitled to an award of punitive damages. Plaintiff

now seeks an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in the amount of
$439,678.26.

DISCUSSION
Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the
court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party in any
action or proceeding brought to enforce the provisions of various civil rights statutes,
including 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Congress' intent in enacting§ 1988 was to attract

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 5

Ql)1~3

10

Jun.28.2016

22:12

Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter

4067217364

Case 3:08-cv-0055L. .JL -r"''''~ Document 247 Filed 02/14,

PAGE.

Page 6 of 28

competent counsel to prosecute civil rights cases, where 'victims ordinarily cannot afford
to purchase legal services at the rates set by the private market.,,, Mendez v. County of

San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1126 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting City ofRiverside v. Rivera,
477 U.S. 561, 576 (1986)). Under the terms of the statute, the plaintiff must be a
"prevailing party" to recover an award of attorney's fees. "[P]laintiffs may be considered
'prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in
litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Hensley

v Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,433 (1983) (internal quotations omitted). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has made clear that, "[e]ven in a case where the

'[p]laintiff succeeded on only one of his many claims against Defendants,' ... the district
court must nonetheless calculate a reasonable fee." Mendez, 540 F.3d at 1128.
Generally, attorney's fees are calculated by multiplying the number of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate-known as the
"lodestar" calculation-and then, if necessary, making adjustments to the lodestar figure
based upon the factors set forth in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir.
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1975),3 that have not been subsumed in the lodestar calculation.4 Mendez v. County ofSan

Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1126 (9th Cir. 2008).
Defendant Blair concedes that Plaintiff is a prevailing party within the meaning of
§ 1988. (Def 's Objection to Pl. 's Atty Fees at 2, Dkt. 226.) He argues, however, that this

case falls within the exception to the general rule for plaintiffs who achieve purely
technical success or receive de minimis relie£ Under this exception, the Court may forgo
the lodestar analysis, Morales v. City ofSan Rafael, 96 F.3d 359,362 (9th Cir. 1996), and
Defendant Blair argues that the Court should significantly reduce the amount of requested
fees-or deny the request in its entirety-because the amount of damages awarded by the
jury in this case was minimal in comparison to the amount sought by Plaintiff.
Alternatively, if the Court determines that the above exception does not apply, Defendant
Blair argues that the time expended on the case and the hourly rates submitted by

3

The twelve Kerr factors include: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the
complexity of the case; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the
preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by
the client or other circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the
experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case;
(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards
in similar cases.
4

"Among the subsumed factors presumably taken into account in either the
reasonable hours component or the reasonable rate component of the lodestar calculation
are: (1) the novelty and complexity of the issues, (2) the special skill and experience of
counsel, (3) the quality of representation, ... (4) the results obtained, and (5) the
contingent nature of the fee agreement." Morales v. City ofSan Rafael, 96 F.3d 359,364
n. 9 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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Plaintiff's counsel in connection with their request for fees are not reasonable and that the
outcome of the case warrants a reduction in the amount of fees awarded. For the reasons

discussed below, while the Court does not find that the outcome in this case brings it
within the exception to the general rule for calculating attorney's fees, the Court does find
that Plaintiff's requested fees are unreasonably high and will recommend that they be
reduced.
1.

Plaintiff's success was neither ''purely technical" nor "de minimis"
In Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), the United States Supreme Court created

an exception to the general rule governing a district court's calculation of attorney's fees

in civil rights cases. "The Court held that 'nominal damages' cases in which the relief is

de minimis are exempted from the general requirements that govern the calculation of
attorney's fees, including the requirement that a lodestar first be calculated." Morales, 96
F.3d at 362 (citing Farrar, 506 U.S. at 116-18 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "The Farrar
exception, which would allow the court to dispense with the calculation of a lodestar and
simply establish a low fee or no fee at all, is limited to cases in which the civil rights
plaintiff 'prevailed' but received only nominal damages and achieved only 'technical'
success." Id. at 362-63.
In this case, the jury found that Defendant Blair had used excessive force against
Plaintiff and awarded $1,954.27 in compensatory damages for medical expenses incurred
by Plaintiff. It is undisputed that the jury was instructed regarding nominal damages and
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was given the option of awarding nominal damages, rejecting that option.

Notwithstanding the award of compensatory damages, Defendant Blair contends that the

award of medical expenses in this case was de minimis, and that the Court may award low
fees or no fees at all under Farrar. The Court does not agree. The Ninth Circuit expressly
has cautioned the district courts from stretching the Supreme Court's holding in Farrar
beyond its scope. See Thomas v. City ofTacoma, 410 F.3d 644,648 (9th Cir. 2005).

Farrar carved out an exception to the congressional mandate contained in 42 U.S.C. §
1988-that the prevailing party in a civil rights action recuperate reasonable attorney's

fees-where the jury finds a technical constitutional violation and only awards nominal
damages. Here, Plaintiff's success can be considered neither purely technical nor de

minimis.
2.

The Lodestar Calculation
"The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is

the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable

hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). This is known as the

lodestar calculation. Plaintiffs attorney Jason Wood submits that he devoted 964 hours to
the case. He seeks attorney's fees for 819.8 hours of work (subtracting 144.2 hours of
work spent exclusively on the second incident) at $300 per hour. (Dec. OfJason Wood1,I
15 and 16, Dkt. 219.) Plaintiff's attorney Gregory Rauch submits that he spent 750.40
hours on the case and seeks attorney's fees for 712.30 hours of work (subtracting 38.1

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 9

00127

Jun.28.2016

22:15

Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter

4067217364

Case 3:08-cv-00552, L-<'~~ Document 247 Filed 02/141

PAGE. 15

Page 10 of 28

hours of work spent exclusively on the second incident) at $250 per hour. (Dec. Of
Gregory Rauch ,r 17, Dkt. 220.) Plaintiff also see.ks attorney's fees for work performed by

two of Mr. Rauch's partners-Robert Magyar (34.6 hours at $200 per hour) and Brian Thie
(13.7 hours at $200 per hour). (Id. at,r,r 19 and 20.) In sum, Plaintiff see.ks $433,675 in
attorney's fees plus $6,003.26 in costs not available under District ofidaho Local Rule
54.l(c)(l)- (9) (but which are available under§ 1988) for a total of$439,678.26.

Defendant Blair argues that, even if the Court does not invoke the exception under
Farrar for purely technical or de minimis success, the time expended and the hourly rates

claimed by Plaintiff's attorneys are not reasonable and the fee award should be reduced to
between 10'" 15 percent of the full amount requested due to Plaintiff's limited success. As
more fully explained below, the Court agrees and will recommend that the fee award be
reduced (although not to the extent requested by Defendant).
A.

Hourly Rate

Reasonable attorney's fees under§ 1988 must be based upon a reasonable hourly
rate. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The appropriate rate is the prevailing market rate "in
the community for similar work perfonned by attorneys of comparable skill, experience,
and reputation." Chalmers v. Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1986).
"[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence in addition to the
attorney's own affidavits that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the
community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience
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and reputation." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n. l I (1984).
Plaintiffs counsel Jason Wood and Gregory Rauch both have submitted
declarations in support of their petition for attorney's fees. In his declaration, Mr. Rauch
states that he handles "[m]ostly divorce, misdemeanor and felony criminal matters at state
level, bankruptcy, and small personal injury cases." (0kt. 220 at 2.) Mr. Rauch has been a
member of the Idaho State Bar since 2007, and he states that his customary rate is $175
per hour. (Id.) However, for more complicated matters, Mr. Rauch states that he charges
$250 per hour, which is the rate he is seeking in this case. Mr. Rauch characterizes his

role in this litigation as "second chair." It also is apparent from Mr. Rauch's declaration
that, at the time of taking on this case, he was inexperienced in civil rights litigation,
which, he indicates, is why he sought the assistance of more experienced counsel.

Mr. Wood has been a member of the Idaho State Bar since 1994. (Dkt. 219 at 2.)

In his declaration, Mr. Wood indicates that, since 2001, his practice has focused
"primarily on representing plaintiffs throughout the State of Idaho, including civil rights
cases involving excessive use of force by police officers" and that he has tried several
cases to judgment. (Id.) Mr. Wood characterizes this case as complex due to the number
of parties involved, multiple incidents, and the uncertainty as to damages. He also
indicates that, "[f]rom the beginning of our representation of Kevin Mays, he has been
unable to pay me or co-counsel, Mr. Rauch, on ~ hourly basis, nor reimburse us for any
of the [sic] our out-of-pocket costs incurred in prosecuting this case." (Id. at 6.) Based
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upon "the rate of what counsel presently charge for federal civil rights litigation and what
other attorneys with similar skill, reputation and experience charge in the Coeur d'Alene
area for similar work[,]" Mr. Wood states that his hourly rate is $300 per hour.

Plaintiffs counsel also have submitted the declaration of Leander James in support
of their fee petition. (Dec. OfLeander L. James, VJ, Dkt. 221.) Mr. James is an attorney
in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, and specializes in complex civil litigation, including civil rights

litigation. He has been a member of the Idaho Bar since 1993. He states that his "hourly
fee schedule for plaintiff's litigation and trial work ranges from a minimum of $200/hr. to

a maximum of $325/hr." (Id. at 15.) Mr. James indicates that his rate is based upon a
number of factors, including the complexity of the case. (Id.) He states that, "[b]ased on
my personal knowledge of the experience, expertise, and abilities of Mr. Wood and of

prevailing and customary hourly fee rates in the Coeur d'Alene area for attorneys sharing
similar experience, reputation, and expertise, in complex and difficult cases of this kind, it
is my opinion that an hourly rate of $300.00 per hour at the present time is warranted
under the circumstances and well within the range of customary rates of attorneys in this
area." (Id. at ,I 10.) Mr. James indicates that "the long delays in receiving compensation,
and the inability of the plaintiffs to pay for costs, all make a substantial hourly fee
appropriate." (Id. at, 13.) Mr. James also opines that $250 per hour is a reasonable
hourly rate for Mr. Rauch.
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In opposition to Plaintiff's motion for fees, and contrary to the declarations of
Messrs. Wood, Rauch, and James, Defendant Blair contends that the case was not
particularly complex, stating that the "case involved a 1-2 second 'scuffle' and raised the
question of whether excessive force was used when Mr. Mays sustained a small laceration
and a black eye." (!)ef Blair's Obj. to Pl. 's Att'y Fees at 5, Dkt. 226.) Defendant
contends that the only complications in this case were of Plaintiff's counsel's own
making, stating that "[t]his case was not complex until the Plaintiff and/or his counsel
tried to 'stretch' this case by adding a 'second' incident and claimed injuries which were
not identified in the medical ~ecords." (Id.) (emphasis in original). Defendant's point is
well taken and, as discussed more fully below, the Court will recommend that the hours
spent on aspects of the case unrelated to the "first incident" not be included in the award
of fees.
However, the Court does not fully agree with Defendant Blair's contention that
this case involved no complexities. Contrary to Defendant Blair's characterization, the
first incident did not involve a "garden variety" case of excessive force where officers are
acting in their law enforcement capacity. Indeed, this case involved a somewhat murky
situation in which the officers were acting pursuant to their community care-taking
function. Moreover, the first incident involved multiple law enforcement officers from
two different agencies and, due to the nature of the incident, Plaintiff was unable to
identify which officer did what to him while he was on the ground. This scenario required
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discovery outside the realm of what can be considered a garden variety excessive force
case and warrants consideration in determining a reasonable fee award in this case.
Based on the above, the undersigned finds that Mr. Wood's hourly rate of $300 per
hour is reasonable and will use that rate in detennining the lodestar figure. However,
based upon Mr. Rauch's experience and the materials filed in support of and in opposition
· to Plaintiff's motion for fees, the Court fmds that Mr. Rauch's hourly rate should not
exceed $175 per hour. This finding is based upon Mr. Rauch' s limited experience (having
only 4-5 years experience and little or no experience with the type of case at bar), his role
in the litigation as second chair, Mr. Rauch' s own customary hourly rate, and the
prevailing rate in the community. The Court finds Mr. James' declaration particularly
instructive on this issue, in which Mr. James indicates that his minimum rate in such cases
is $200 per hour. Mr. James has been practicing over 20 years longer than Mr. Rauch and
has substantial experience in this type of case. Mr. Rauch' s claimed rate of $250 per hour
is unreasonably high and the Court will base the lodestar figure for Mr. Rauch based upon
an hourly rate of $17 5 per hour.

B.

Hours Reasonably Expended

Under§ 1988, prevailing parties may only be compensated for those hours of work
that were "reasonably expended." See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34. The moving party
bears the burden of establishing the hours claimed and must carry that burden by
submitting adequate documentation of those hours. Id. at 437. The Court will not grant a
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fee award for "hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Id. at 43334. It is well settled that a "plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney's fees even for claims

on which she did not prevail, if they 'involve a common core of facts or are based on
related legal theories."' Mendez, 540 F.3d at 1125-26. Conversely, a plaintiff is not
entitled to an award of fees for unsuccessful claims that were "unrelated to" the
successful claims. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.

Mr. Wood states in his declaration that he "necessarily and reasonably devoted 964
hours of work to the prosecution of this case." (Dkt. 219 at 5.) Plaintiff, however, is not
seeking reimbursement for time spent exclusively on the "second incident." Mr. Wood
represents that he spent 144.2 hours exclusively on the second incident and therefore only
seeks compensation for 819.8 hours. (Id.) Mr. Rauch represents that he spent 750.4 hours
on the case and 38.1 hours exclusively on the second incident. Thus, Mr. Rauch seeks
compensation for 712.3 hours of work.
Defendant Blair objects to the number of hours claimed by Plaintiffs attorneys on
several grounds. Each will be addressed below.
(1)

Time Spent on Second Incident

Plaintiff's counsel do not seek compensation for hours spent on the second
incident. Defendant Blair contends, however, that Plaintiff's counsel have not excluded
all of the hours spent on the second incident and seeks a reduction of207.2 hours. In
support of this argument, Defendant Blair has submitted two exhibits highlighting the
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hours spent on the second incident by attorneys Wood and Rauch that Defendant
contends should have been excluded. (Time Attributable to Second Incident (Wood),
Exhibit A, Dkt. 226-1 pp. 1-7; Time Attributable to Second Incident (Rauch}, Dkt. 226-1
pp. 8-11.)
Having carefully reviewed Plaintiffs counsel's billing records, the Court finds that
a reduction of 207 .2 hours of time spent on the second incident is warranted.5 Defendant
Blair has supplied the Court with a copy of Plaintiffs counsel's billing records,
highlighting the hours spent on the second incident by Messrs. Wood and Rauch, and the
Court will not go through the individual billing entries again here. However, the Court
will recommend that Mr. Wood's hours be reduced by 186 hours and Mr. Rauch's hours

be reduced by 21.2 hours.
(2)

Time Spent on Third Incident

Like the hours claimed for the second incident, Defendant Blair argues that
Plaintiff's counsel should not be compensated for hours spent working on the third
incident.
As indicated above, Plaintiff sought leave to amend his: complaint to include

claims concerning a third incident in which Sergeant Piche of the Lewiston Police
5

This includes time for work relating to neurological damages. Plaintiffs
attorneys have argued that the time spent on assessing Plaintiff's neurological damages
cannot be allocated exclusively to either the first or second incidents because Plaintiff
sustained head injuries during both incidents. At trial, however, Plaintiffs expert did not
opine that Plaintiff sustained any neurological damages as a result of the first incident.
The Court will recommend that the time spent on this issue be excluded.
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Department allegedly harassed Mr. Mays. (Second Mot. To Amend Complaint, Dkt. 44.)
Other than the fact that the third incident involved an officer from the Lewiston Police
Department, the incident had no bearing on Plaintiffs claims concerning the first
incident. Ultimately, Plaintiff withdrew his attempt to add a claim related to the third
incident. (Deel. ofJason Wood re: Mot. to Amend, Dkt. 67.)
Defendant Blair has submitted an exhibit outlining the hours spent by Plaintiff's
counsel on the third incident, which Defendant seeks to exclude. (Time Attributable to

Third Incident, Exhibit B, Dkt. 226-1 pp. 12-13.) The exhibit shows that Mr. Wood spent
22. 7 hours on the third incident and Mr. Rauch spent 2.3 hours on third incident. The
Court agrees that the third incident was not factually or legally related to Plaintiff's
successful claims and the hours spent on the incident should not be included in Plaintiff's
award of attorney's fees. Mr. Wood's time will be reduced by an additional 22.7 hours
and Mr. Rauch's time will be reduced by an additional 2.3 hours.
(3)

Claim Against Defendant Joedy Mundell

Early in the litigation, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of Officer Joedy
Mundell, who was named as a defendant in Plaintiff's initial complaint. The stipulation

states that each party is to bear his or her own attorney's fees and costs concerning the
dismissed claim. (Stip. For Dismissal of Officer Joedy Mundell, Dkt. 38.) Defendant Blair

has pointed out that Mr. Wood billed 1.1 hours related to the claim against Officer
Mundell and Mr. Rauch billed .2 hours related to the claim against Officer Mundell.
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Based upon the stipulation of the parties, the Court will recommend that these hours be
subtracted from Plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees.
(4)

Time Spent Communicating and Responding to Discovery and
Information from Nez Perce County

Defendant Blair argues that the time spent on communications and responses to

Nez Perce County's pleadings, motions, briefs and interaction with the County's attorney
should be excluded from Plaintiff's award of attorney's fees. Defendant Blair seeks the
exclusion of these hours based on the ground that the jury did not make any finding
against the County or any of its deputies, and the Plaintiff did not prevail on those claims.
The Court disagrees.
It is undisputed that Deputy Jose Rodriguez and Sgt. John Hilderbrand of the Nez

Perce County Sheriff's Department were involved in the first incident and that Plaintiff
brought suit against the officers and the County based on that involvement.
Notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff did not prevail against the County or officers
Rodriguez or Hilderbrand, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees for the hours spent on the
claims against the County and its officers related to the first incident. Mendez, 540 F .3d at
1126 ("A plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney's fees even for claims on which she did
not prevail, if they involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal
theories.") Plaintiff's counsel have represented that they excluded the hours exclusively
spent on the second incident and the Court has excluded additional hours pointed out by
Defendant Blair that remained in Plaintiff's counsel's billing directly attributable to the
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second incident.
(5)

Reduction for Duplicative and Excessive Hours

Defendant Blair argues that some of the hours claimed by Plaintiff's attorneys are
either duplicative or excessive. Specifically, Defendant points out that Mr. Wood and Mr.
Rauch both claimed time for attending the depositions of the same witnesses. Defendant
also argues that the following claimed hours are excessive: 36 hours spent by Mr. Rauch
preparing the initial complaint; 24 hours spent by Mr. Rauch working on closing
argument; and 24 hours spent preparing for closing argument by Mr. Wood.

Plaintiff agrees that he should not receive an award of fees for time Mr. Rauch
spent on depositions that Mr. Wood also attended. Similarly, Plaintiff does not object to
reducing Mr. Rauch's time for the initial complaint to IO hours. However, Plaintiff does
talce issue with Defendant Blair's argument that the time spent on closing arguments was
excessive. On this issue, the Court will defer to Plaintiff's counsel's judgment. Moreno v.

City ofSacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008) ("By and large, the court should
defer to the winning lawyer's professional judgment as to how much time he was required
to spend on the case .... ").

Based on the above, and having reviewed Defendant Blair's exhibits highlighting
the hours he claims are excessive or duplicative, (Dkt. 226-2 pp. 7-8), the Court agrees
that 38.1 hours should be excluded from Mr. Rauch's time. The Court, however, does not
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agree that 18 hours should be excluded from Mr. Wood's time.6
(6)

Mr. Wood's Travel Time

The facts giving rise to this litigation occurred in North Idaho. After
unsuccessfully seeking local lead counsel to help him with the case, Mr. Rauch accepted
the assistance of Mr. Wood, who lives in Southeastern Idaho. It appears that Mr. Wood
made approximately eight trips from Idaho Falls, Idaho, to North Idaho in preparation for
this case. Mr. Wood drove on all but one of these trips-each taking approximately eight

hours. Defendant Blair objects to these hours, arguing that it was unnecessary for Mr.
Wood to travel to North Idaho because co-counsel already was located there. Defendant
Blair also argues that Mr. Wood's driving time is excessive-pointing out that Mr. Wood

flew to Lewiston on one occasion and that it only took five hours as opposed to eight.
The Court disagrees with Defendant Blair's suggestion that Mr. Wood's time in
North Idaho should be entirely excluded because co-counsel was already located there.
The Court has recognized that Mr. Rauch was inexperienced in this matter and adjusted
his hourly rate accordingly. The fact that Mr. Wood traveled to North Idaho to prepare for
this case is not in itself unreasonable. However, the Court does agree that the driving time

is excessive and each trip to and from North Idaho will be reduced to five hours, which is
the time it took Mr. Wood to fly to Lewiston. Thus, having reviewed Defendant Blair's

6

Defendant Blair also states that 2.8 hours claimed by Mr. Wood appear to be
clerical errors and that 4.5 hours claimed by Mr. Rauch appear to be clerical errors. The
Court agrees, and these hours will be excluded.
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exhibit highlighting Mr. Wood's travel time, (Dkt. 226-2 at 9), the Court will subtract 35
hours attributable to Mr. Wood's travel time.
(7)

Time Spent on Criminal Prosecution

Mr. Rauch seeks compensation for 67.6 hours spent working on Mr. Mays'
criminal prosecution for resisting arrest. Plaintiff argues that "[i]t was necessary for Mays
to obtain a dismissal of the criminal charges of resisting arrest; otherwise his section 1983
claim would have been barred.'' (Reply to Def Blair's Obj. To Pl. 's Atty Fees at 16, 0kt.
235.) While this may be true, the Ninth Circuit ~as indicated that these hours may not be
claimed under§ 1988. Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384, 1389 (9th Cir. 1989)
(explaining that attorney's fees for time spent in defending criminal charge prior to

bringing an action under§ 1983 may be claimed as damages in the civil rights suit, but
that they may not be claimed as attorney's fees under§ 1988). Based on Borunda, the
time Mr. Rauch spent on Plaintiff's criminal charge (67.6 hours) will be excluded.
(8)

Time Spent on Claims of On-Going Harassment

Plaintiff's counsel have submitted entries seeking compensation for time spent
pertaining to Plaintiff's allegations that he was being harassed continually by the

Lewiston police. Defendant Blair seeks the exclusion of this time as it was unrelated to
the claims on which Plaintiff prevailed. The Court agrees and will exclude 1. 7 hours from
Mr. Rauch's compensable time and 1.3 hours from Mr. Wood's compensable time.
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Hours Claimed by Mr. Magyar and Mr. Thie

Plaintiff seeks attorney's fees for work done by Mr. Rauch' s partners Robert
Magyar and Brian Thie. Mr. Magyar claims a total of34.6 hours at $200 per hour and Mr.
Thie claims 13. 7 hours at $200 per hour. Defendant Blair objects to an award of
attorney's fees for both of Mr. Rauch's partners for several reasons. As explained below,
the undersigned will recommend that both attorneys' hours be reduced.
Concerning Mr. Magyar, 23.4 of the 34.6 hours claimed relate to Mr. Mays'
criminal proceedings. As discussed above, those hours are not compensable for the
purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The remaining 11.2 hours appear to relate to Plaintiff's

claims in this action. However, while Mr. Rauch's declaration states that Plaintiff is
seeking $200 per hour for Mr. Magyar's work, the billing entries attached to Mr. Rauch's
declaration show that Mr. Magyar billed at a rate of $150 per hour. The undersigned will
recommend that Plaintiff be awarded attorney's fees for 11.2 hours of Mr. Magyar's work
at $150 per hour.
With respect to Mr. Thie, Defendant Blair objects to three entries that appear to be
clerical errors. For instance, Mr. Thie claims 1.5 hours of work on June 24, 2011. This
case, however, was completed on June 23, 2011, and Defendant argues that this time
should be excluded. The Court agrees. Similarly, Mr. Thie claims 3 hours of work on
May 20, 2011, for work done reviewing and editing a motion for summary judgment. The
deadline for summary judgment briefing, however, had expired in April of 2011 and
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Plaintiff filed his reply to Defendants' motion for summary judgment on April 30, 2011.
It will be recommended that these hours be excluded. Finally, Mr. Thie's billing sheet

contains an entry for research on res ipsa loquitar [sic] and ''joint liability theories." (Dkt.
220 at 36.) This entry appears to be related to another case and the 2.5 hours claimed for

the work will be excluded. Thus, the undersigned will recommend that 8 of the 13.7 hours
claimed by Mr. Thie be exluded and that Mr. Thie's time be compensated at $150 per
hour-the same rate as Mr. Magyar.
(C)

Results Obtained

In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 242 (1983), the Supreme Court held that if the
party seeking attorney's fees has not succeeded on all claims, the district court should
award only an amount that is reasonable in relation to the results of the suit. If the results
are excellent despite the less than complete success, the fee movant should obtain a fully
compensatory fee, including compensation for hours devoted to the claims that were
ultimately unsuccessful. Id. at 434. In the absence of "excellent" results, however, a fully
compensatory fee may be excessive, and the district court should reduce the lodestar
figure to account for the limited success. Id. There is no rule or formula for making a
reduction; rather, it is within the discretion of the district court to determine a reasonable
fee. Id. at 436-37 ("There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations.
The district court may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it
may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success. The court necessarily has
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discretion in making this equitable judgment.")

Defendant Blair argues that Plaintiffs award of attorney's fees should be
significantly reduced given his limited success. Defendant Blair "submits that this Court
would be justified in awarding the Plaintiff 10 - 15 % or less of the amount of attorney fee
claimed once the appropriate number of hours are identified." (Def Blair's Obj. To Pl. 's
Att'y Fees at 9) (emphasis in original). The undersigned agrees that Plaintiff's award of
attorney's fees should be adjusted to account for Plaintiff's limited success, but not to the

extent sought by Defendant Blair.
In his initial complaint, Plaintiff brought suit against four police officers employed

by the City of Lewiston and three deputies employed by Nez Perce County Sheriff's
Department. Plaintiff also sought relief against the City and the County. All of the claims

in the initial complaint related to the first incident. Plaintiff's initial complaint sought
$1.5 million in compensatory, punitive, incidental, and consequential damages. Plaintiff

later amended his complaint, however, and did not seek any specific amount.
The case proceeded to trial against five officers involved in the first incident.
During closing arguments, Plaintiff's counsel suggested that Mr. Mays' general damages
may be worth $200,000 to $300,000. The jwy found that only Officer Blair had used

excessive force and the jwy awarded Plaintiff $1,954.27 in compensatory damages for
medical expenses.
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Defendant Blair suggests that an 85 - 90% reduction is appropriate in this case. In
support of this contention, Defendant Blair points out that Plaintiff only succeeded
against one of eight defendants, which is a 12.5% success rate. Defendant Blair also
points out that the initial figure of $1.5 million requested in comparison with the
$1,956.27 recovered is 0.13%. The Court finds that the results obtained in this case
cannot be considered "excellent" and that a fully compensatory fee would be excessive in
this case under Hensley. The question is how much the award should be reduced to
account for Plaintiff's limited success.
The Court does not agree that Plaintiffs award should be reduced by 85 - 90%.
The verdict against Defendant Blair finding that he had used excessive force during the
welfare check conferred a benefit on the public and possesses some value. As the Ninth
Circuit found in Morales v. City ofSan Rafael, the litigation in this case served the
significant public policy interest "of helping to protect [Plaintiff] and persons like him
from being subjected to similar unlawful treatment in the future" and the verdict
"constitutes a warning to law-enforcement officers not to treat civilians
unconstitutionally." 96 F.3d at 364-65.
The Court finds that the percentages provided by Defendant Blair are a useful
starting point. Plaintiff succeeded against one of eight defendants equaling 12.5% and on
one claim out of six equaling 16.66%. Using these figures as a starting point and giving
Plaintiff a bump in fees in recognition of the public benefit conferred by the verdict in this
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case, the Court will recommend that the lodestar calculation include a 75% reduction to
account for Plaintiff's limited success.

Talcing into consideration the reductions outlined above and the reduction for
limited success, the Court will recommend a lodestar calculation as follows:

Jason Wood
964 total hours claimed
- 186 (Second Incident)
- 22. 7 (Third Incident)
- 1.1 (claim against Mundell)
-2.8 (clerical errors)
- 35 (excessive travel time)
- 1.3 (on going harassment)
715.1 Revised total hours
715.1 x $300 per hour= $214,530.00 x 0.25 for limited success adjustment

= $53,632.50
Gregory Rauch

750.40 total hours claimed
- 21.2 (Second Incident)
- 2.3 (Third Incident)
- 0.2 (claim against Mundell)
- 38.1 (duplicative or excessive hours)
- 4.5 (clerical errors)
- 67.6 (criminal case)
- I. 7 (on going harassment)
- 34.6 (Mr. Magyar's hours)
- 13.7 (Mr. Thie's hours)
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566.5 Revised total hours 7
566.5 x $175 per hour= $99,137.50 x 0.25 for limited success adjustment

=$24,784.40
Robert Magyar
34.6 total hours claimed
- 23 .4 (criminal case)
11.2 Revised total hours
11.2 x $150 per hour= $1,680.00 x 0.25 for limited success adjustment
=$420

Brian Thie
13.7 total hours claimed
- 7 (cleric.al errors)

6.7 Revised total hours

6.7 x $150 per hour= $1,005.00 x 0.25 for limited success adjustment
-$251.25

$79,088.15 Total Lodestar Figure

$79,088.15 + $5,703.26 (adjusted costs)8 = $84,791.41 (total recommend attorney's
7

Because the Court has determined that Messrs. Magyar and Thie are entitled to
an hourly rate different from that of Mr. Rauch, the Court has completely deducted their
hours from Mr. Rauch's lodestar calculation and reassesses them according to their own
rate below.
8

This figure represents adjusted costs recoverable under § 1988 but not taxable as
costs under Local Rule 54.1. Defendant Blair objected to Mr. Rauch claiming service
costs, which are provided for under the Federal Rules. The Court agrees that this item
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fee award)

RECOMMENDATION
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
Plaintiffs Petition for Award of Attorney Fees (Dkt. 218) be GRANTED IN
PART and that Plaintiff be awarded $84,791.41 in attorney's fees and costs under 42

u.s.c. § 1988.
Written objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within

fourteen (14) days pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l) and Dist. Idaho L. Rule 72.l(b), or

as a result of failing to do so, that party may waive the right to raise factual and/or legal
objections to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
DATED: February 14, 2012

~
Honorable Candy W. Dale
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

should not have been included and has subtracted $300 from Plaintiffs costs. The
undersigned has reviewed the remainder of Plaintiffs non-taxable costs and finds them
compensable.
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T. Jason Wood, Esq., TSR#5016

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls ID 83404
Telephone: (208) 522-1230
Gregory R. Rauch, ISB# 7389
THE LAW OFFICES OF MAGYAR & RAUCH, PLLC
PO Box 8074
Moscow, Idaho 83843
Tel: (208) 882-1906
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN TIIE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

KEVJN E. MAYS,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

TODD STOBIE, et al.,

)
)
)

Case No. CV08-552-C-EJL-CWD

)

v.

Defendants.

DECLARATION OFT. JASON WOOD
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AWARD
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

)
)

I, T. Jason Wood, declare under penalty of perjury, as follows:
1.

I am a member of Thomsen Stephens Law Offices, PLLC, attorneys for Plaintiff in

this matter and I make this affidavit from personal knowledge.

1-
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2.

I have been a member of the Idaho State Bar since September 1994. I am also

admitted to practice before the United States District Court for the District ofidaho, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
3.

I was a law clerk to United States Magistrate Judge Lany M. Boyle from May 1994

through July 1995, where I assisted Judge Boyle in numerous civil rights cases.
4.

Since 1995 I have practiced in the law firm ofThomsen Stephens Law Offices, PLLC,

in Idaho Falls, Idaho., an eight-member finn. I have been a shareholder in the firm since 2001.

5.

I was on the Regional Board of Directors for the Idaho Trial Lawyer's Association

from 2005-2010.. I served on its Executive Committee as ITLA' s Secretary 2010-2011, and I am
currently its Treasurer.
6.

Initially my practice was wide-ranging, including civil and criminal defense, family ·

law, and civil plaintiff's work. Since 2001, my practice narrowed to focus primarily on representing
plaintiffs throughout the State ofldaho, including civil rights cases involving excessive use of force
by police officers. I have tried several cases to judgment, and have briefed and argued several cases

before the Idaho Court of Appeals, Idaho Supreme Court, and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, two
of them civil rights cases. 1
7.

I first became involved in this case as counsel for Plaintiff Kevin Mays in December

2008 at the request of my co-counsel, Gregory Rauch, who sought someone with expertise in civil
rights litigation. I officially became lead counsel ofrecord on February 3, 2009. (See Doc. 3).
1

Including: Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 879 P.2d 1165 (1999); Hindmarsh v. Mock,
2001 Ida.App. LEXIS 113 (Mayl7,2001); Clarkv. Raty, 137Idaho343,48P.3d672(2002);Kage/
v. U.S. Anny Corps ofEng'rs, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 8511, No. 98-35697 (91b Cir.) (civil rights);
Dickson v. Scoville, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 8511, No. 98-36062 (9th Cir.); Decoria v. County of
Jefferson, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10788, No. 07-36066) (civil rights).
2-
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8.

I decided to take this case knowing few, if any, attorneys would be willing to

undertake such representation because ofthe difficulties inherent in Plaintiff's case, because ofldaho
juries' reluctance to find against law enforcement officers, particularly where plaintiffs have a
criminal history and extensive damages are not clear. In undertaking representation of Plaintiff,
despite the aforementioned difficulties, I also knew that if I did not prevail I would not be
compensated for my efforts nor reimbursed for my out-of-pocket costs advanced during the course
of the litigation.
9.

Upon carefully reviewing the evidence ofPlaintiff's mental condition following both

the First Incident (December 23, 2006) and the Second incident (November 17, 2009), I determined
the complaint should be amended to add the Second Incident. The primary reason for joining the
Second Incident with the First Incident was that Plaintiff sustained head injuries in both incidents,
and the evidence suggested neuro-cognitive injury that could have been caused by either or both
incidents. The risk was that the defendants responsible for the First Incident would point the finger
at the defendants responsible for the Second Incident for causing Plaintiffs brain damage, and vice
versa. Had the claims not been joined, the result thereby could have been that both sets of
defendants would either be held responsible for Plaintiff's brain damage, or neither ofthem, simply
by blaming the other. (See Docs. 20-3; 24 at 4-5).
10.

The defendants did in fact follow this tactic, suggesting throughout these proceedings

the cumulative effects oftrauma to Plaintiff's head, other than the incidents alleged in the complaint,
may have caused or contributed to Plaintiff's current mental and visual problems. (See, e.g., Docs.
107-1; 115-15). Therefore I was, and remain, of the opinion that in order to prosecute Plaintiff's
claim based on the First Incident it was necessary to pursue the Second Incident in the same case.
3-
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Nevertheless, I kept detailed records ofthe time I spent in this case exclusively on the

Second Incident to the extent possible. The amount of time spend exclusively on the Second
Incident was 144.2 hours. These hours appear underlined in my attached billing records.
12.

The time I spent devoted to this case was significant due not only to the factual, legal,

and evidentiary complexity of the case, but because of the large number of witnesses identified in

discovery as witnesses with knowledge (over 75), the number of expert witnesses offering opinions
on diverse and complex issues (13), the number of depositions taken (22), the thousands of pages
of documents produced and generated in discovery and in litigation in this case, the time required
for the several trips I was required to take from Idaho Falls to Lewiston, Moscow, and Coeur d'Alene
for this case, and the necessity of being prepared to go to trial on all issues and evidence until the
Court issued its 06/01/11 decision on the defendants• motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 162).
13.

The hours listed are based upon contemporaneous records which I personally kept as

I did the work. All of the hours listed were reasonable and necessary to the prosecution of this case.

I have exercised billing judgment and excluded many hours.
14.

Mr. Rauch acted as c~counsel in th is matter. He played a supportive but crucial role

throughout this case, especially during summary judgment proceedings and the &-day trial of this
matter, examining almost half the witnesses in our case, cross-examining almost half the defense

witnesses. I reviewed and edited documents he prepared and filed with the Court. but his work was
not duplicative of my own. Although I took most of the depositions on behalf of Plaintiff in this
case, we othetwise divided most of the work. For example, Mr. Rauch was primarily responsible
for briefing in opposition to the defendants' motions for summary judgment regarding the First
Incident, while I was responsible for all the briefing and work regarding the Second Incident.
4-
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Because of the tremendous amount of time and money Plaintiffs' counsel must personally invest in
a case like this, with the possibility of payment contingent on the final outcome in the distant, Mr.
Rauch and I had every motivation to, and in fact did, use our best efforts not to duplicate our efforts
or waste our precious resources on issues or time we believed would not benefit the case.
15.

The hourly rate claimed for my time submitted with this Affidavit is $300 per hour.

This hourly rate is based upon the rate of what counsel presently charge for federal civil rights
litigation and what other attorneys with similar skill, reputation and experience charge in the Coeur
d'Alene area for similar work. It also reflects the rates in similar cases charged by attorneys with
similar skill, reputation and experience in the federal District of Idaho. See Affidavits of Walt
Sinclair and Kurt Hozler attached to the Memorandum filed in support of Plaintiff's petition for
attorney fees. See also LaPeter v. Canada Life Ins. Co., Case No. CV-06-121-S-BLW, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 40263, **7-9 (D. Idaho, May 11, 2009); Suter v. National Rehab Partners, Inc., Case
No. CV03-15-S-BLW (2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70952, **9-10 (D. Idaho, Sept. 24, 2007).

16.

An itemization of my attorney time, expended in this action is attached to this

Declaration as Exhibit 1. I have necessarily and reasonably devoted 964 hours of work to the
prosecution of this case, both the First and Second Incidents, at the hourly rate of $300/hr. As
previously indicated, damage issues regarding injuries to Plaintiff's brain and left eye in both
incidents were clearly intertwined, and therefore it was necessary to join the Second Incident with
the First. Nevertheless, Plaintiff is not seeking reimbursement for time spent exclusively on the
Second incident. The total hours spent exclusively on the Second incident was 144.2 hours.
Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for time necessarily and reasonably spent on the First Incident only,
which for me was 819.8 hours, and for Mr. Rauch was 712.30.
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From the beginning of our representation of Kevin Mays, he has been unable to pay

me or co-counsel, Mr. Rauch, on an hourly basis, nor reimburse us for any of the our out-of-pocket
costs incurred. in prosecuting this case.
18.

Virtually all the time I devoted to prosecuting Plaintiff's claims against all other

defendants than Donald Blair, pertaining to the First Incident set forth in the Amended Complaint,
were necessary for, and directly benefitted, Plaintiff's claims against Donald Blair. Donald Blair was
the supervising law enforcement officer on the scene, the most experienced, and he was the officer

most involved in the excessive use of force against Plaintiff on December 23, 2006. Plaintiff was
face down on the ground when the officers struck him and, consequently, he could not identify who
used what force against him. Throughout this litigation the defendants, including Blair, contended
that they did not strike Plaintiff with a blunt object, and that Plaintiff had failed to identify any
specific action by the any ofthe individual defendants that caused his injuries. (See, e.g., Docs. 1071 at 10; 124 at 3-7). They also contended at trial that Plaintiff was intoxicated and therefore could
not recall what happened to him. Therefore it was absolutely necessary to Plaintiff's claims against
Blair to conduct all the discovery Plaintiff's counsel conducted in this case regarding all witnesses
to the incident, any investigations pertaining thereto, damages, and to obtain expert opinions from
David Neal regarding use of force and damages. Likewise, because Plaintiff could not identify
which officer did what to him, he was required to name all officers in close proximity and defend
motions for summary judgment by such officers. (See Doc. 116 at 24-28). Furthermore, the trial
testimony of each of the individual defendants other than Blair were crocial to obtaining the
judgment against defendant Blair. It is simply impossible to separately identify time devoted solely
to claims against defendant Blair for the claims made against the other defendants which were
6-
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unsuccesful, since such claims arose from a common nucleus of operative facts as the claims against
the other defendants originally named in the First Incident, and such claims were inextricably
intertwined with one another.
19.

Plaintiff also seeks $4,268.80 in costs that could not be included in Plaintiffs Bill of

Costs, but which I have incurred and normally would be required to pay, in addition to the attorney
fees, including travel expenses such a mileage, rental cars, meals, and lodging, as set forth in the
underlined, italicized and bolded entries on the last 3 pages of the Exhibit I attached hereto, and
which are therefore awardable as a component of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct under the laws of the

United States to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Dated this 141h day of July, 2011.

Isl
T. Jason Wood

7-

DECLARATION OF COUNSEL ...

::L.
0 U'1'.1

Jun.28.2016

22:36

Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter. 4067217364

PAGE. 41

Case 3:08-cv-OOSb... ·c:JL -r?-%') Document 219 Filed 07/1 .. , 1 Page 8 of 8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on July 14, 2011, I filed the foregoing electronically through the

CM.IECF system, which caused the following parties or counsel to be served by electronic means,
as more fully reflected on the Notice of Electronic Filing:

BRIAN K. JULIAN
(bjulian@ajhlaw.com)
CHRIS H. HANSEN

(chhansen@ajhlaw.com)
SONYALEE R. NUTSCH

(snutsch@clbnnc.com)

GREGORY R. RAUCH
(grauch@magyarlawfirm.com)

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
By:

:.:;Is:!_./_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

T. Jason Wood
Attorney for Plaintiff
F:16936\Plendings\080 Deel Atty Fees.wpd
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T. Jason Wood, Esq., ISB ff. 5016

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Telephone: (208) 522-1230
Gregory R. Rauch, ISB# 7389

THE LAW OFFICES OF MAGYAR & RAUCH. PLLc
POBox8074

Moscow, Idaho 83843
Tel: (208) 882-1906
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTR1CT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

KEVIN E. MAYS,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

Case No. CV08-552-C-EJL-CWD

)
V,

TODD STOBIE, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

DECLARATION OF
LEANDER L. JAMES, VI

I, Leander L. James, IV, declare under penalty of perjury, as follows:
l.

I am a shareholder in and a founding member ofthe firm ofJames, Vernon & Weeks,

P.A., in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. I have been actively practicing law since 1993. I am fifty-one years
old. I was admitted to the Idaho State Bar on September 23, 1993. I was admitted to the

Washington Bar on November 10, 1994. I am also admitted to practice before the United States
l -
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District Courts for the District of Idaho, Eastern and Western Districts of Washington, and the
Eastern District ofWisconsin. I am rated BV with Martindale-Hubbell. I am a Past-President ofthe
Idaho Trial Lawyers Association (ITLA), and I am currently an Amicus Committee Chair for that
organization. I am an appomted board member of the Idaho State Bar Professional Conduct Board.
Thus, I often interact with other members of the Bar on issues of legal professionalism.
2.

I specializ.e in complex civil litigation and trial work, mcluding catastrophic injury

cases, employment law, civil rights litigation like the instant case, multi-district litigation, and

commercial litigation, both for plaintiffs and defendants, but a majority on behalf of plaintiffs.
About 75% ofmy cases have been for contingent fees approximately25% have been hourly. I have
been involved in many sophisticated litigation and trial battles and have tried numerous cases to
verdict. Most of my trials have lasted at least 5 days.

3.

I have presented at seminars on behalf the Idaho Bar Association, Kootenai County Bar

Association, the Idaho Trial Lawyers Association and the Western Trial Lawyers Association on subjects
of civil litigation and trial advocacy. I have published, at the request of editors, in the Idaho State Bar

joumal Advocate and the Idaho Trial. Lmryers Association Journal on issues of civil litigation and
insurance law. I have testified, at the request of legislators and public interest groups, before the Idaho
State Legislatmeregarding issues ofcivil litigation and insurance. I have presented two cases before the

Idaho Supreme Court and one case before the Idaho Court of Appeals, including the cases ofJohnson v.
Sanchez, 140 Idaho 667 (Ct App. 2005) and Akers v. D.L White et. al, Docket Nos. 30795 and 30845.

4.

The majority ofthe civil litigator's work is done out of court. e.g. through investigation.

written discovery, depositions, legalresem:cb, briefing, motion practice, mediations and arbitrations. But
when the case goes to trial, the work increa.5e5 exponentially. In the past five years I have litigated over
2-
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ninety-five civil cases, many involving complex litigation and personal injmy. I have litigated most of
these cases through written discovery and depositions. In this time frame I have litigated approximately

twenty civil cases through discoveiy and trial preparation (i.e. the case settled shortly before or during

trial). IhavetriedatleastsixteencivilcasestojuryverdictsasthePlaintiff'sattomey,includinginsurance
and complex--civil cases, such as medical malpractice cases. At least five of my trials have lasted more
than seven working days. Four ofthese trials laste.d fourteen working days or more. One of these cases
was a two-week, complex, civil litigation actionm Anoka County, Minnesota. Also, I have mediated and

arbitrated a nmnber of personal injury cases as both the Plaintiff's attorney and as the mediator and
arbitrator.
5.

My hourly fee schedule for plaimiff's litigation and 1rial work ranges from a minimum

of$200/hr. to a maximum of $325/br. The complexities and nature of the litigation drive the decisionmaking on the appropriate hourly rate. My partners, Craig Vernon and Susan Weeks, charge similar
amounts as their ordinary hourly rates in such representation.
6.

I am personally f.amiliar with the billing pmctices of a number of law finns and lawyers

throughout the States ofldaho and Washington, particularly northern. Idaho and P.astem Washington,
including Coeur d'Alene, Idaho and Spokane, Washington. I have developed this knowledge in a
number of ways including my. previous work litigating with other attorneys and finns, informal

conversations with professional colleagues, presentations during professional development conferences,
and on a number of occasions, having other attorneys prepare affidavitB regarding their fee practices.
7.

There are a large number of factors that impact an attorney's hourly rate. The factors

include, but are not limited to, the unique knowledge that the attorney can put to WOik for the client, the

relationship with the particular client, the risks p~ted by the particular litigation, the complexity of
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the case and length of the case, the nature of the opposing party, the stream of business a client can
provide, the desirability of the case and likelihood of getting paid over how long a period of time.

8.

For example, my experience has taught me that large corporate institutions and insurance

companies get a "good deal" (i.e. a better price) and can retain lawyers who could otherwise command
a much higher fee because they offer a regular stream of business for the lawyer. Such institutions also
provide work that the more experienced attorney can have perfonned by younger, less experienced
lawyers. Often the "originating attorney'' in such situations gives this work to the least experienced

lawyer, financially bene:fitting the "originating attorney," thus effectively increasing his or her net hourly
income. My furn does not compensate for such "origination."
9.

I amfamiliarwith Jason Wood through the Idaho Trial Lawyers Association (ITI.A), and

by professional reputation. He served on the Regional Board of Directors Regional Board of Directors

for the ITIA Idaho Trial Lawyers Association from 2005-2010, while I was on the Board ofDirectors,
Executive Committee, and as its president His reputation in the legal community is as one of the most
knowledgeable and capable attorneys in Idaho regarding Civil Rights litigation. I have reviewed his

declaration and the declaration ofhis co-counsel, Mr. Oregoiy Rauch, filed in support oftheir motion for

attorney fees in the above matter.
.

1O.

.

Based onniy personal~owledge ofthe experience, expertise, and abilities ofMr. Wood

and of prevailing and customary hourly fee rates in the Coeur d'Alene area for attorneys sharing similar
experience, reputation, and expertise, in complex and difficult cases ofthis kind, it is my opinion that an
hourly rate of$300.00 per hour at the present time is warranted under the circumstances and well within
the range of customary rates of attorneys in this area. I am familiar with a number of attorneys who

would charge a higher hourly fee for complex and difficult plaintiff's civil litigation. This is particularly
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true in litigating against governmental entities and employees, given their ability to "throw" essentiaJly

unlimited resources at the litigation. I charge $250..325/hr for such cases.

11.

My professional opinion based on my experience, background and education is that

$300.00 per hour in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, would be a reasonable rate if an attorney were to get paid
regularly as the case proceeded to resolution. Many attomeys who regularly work on a contingency fee

basis would not even begin the work on a case ofthis complexity against governmental defendants unless
they bad a realistic expectation that they had a substantial possibility they would ultimately recover four
to five times the $300.00 hourly rate. I do know that there are a number of lawyers in Idaho, particularly

counsel with comparable years of practice as Mr. Wood now charging $300.00 to $400.00 an hour for
complex civil litigation

12.

I can state without hesitation that most attomeys in private practice would refuse to

undertake this case in the first place because of the difficulties inherent in such civil rights litigation and

attorneys' m:rfamiliarity with the legal issues and substantive facts. It would widoubtedly be a time and
money sink. and even if the plaintiff were fortUnate enough to prevail it would be several years before
costs would be reimbursed and any compensation would be received for the attorney's efforts.

Consequently. citizens in need oflegal representation on civil rights issues often can't find an attorney
willing to represent them, because the risks of not being adequately compensated are just too great
Having reviewed this case. and in light of the several problems it entails, such as multiple defendant

issues, pre-existing condition issues, multiplo-incident issues, and difficult damage issues, in addition to
the usual difficulties suing police officers and governmental entities. the risks were so great that in my
opinion it would be highly unlikely that ANY attorney in this area would have taken this case.
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Significantly, the inability ofthe plaintiffto pay any fees, the unique risks associated with

ever obtaining a fee awaro in this type of case, the long delays in receiving compensation, and the

inability of the plaintiffs to pay for costs, all make a substantial hourly fee appropriate. Tue difficulty,
even unlikelihood, of PJaintiffi; obtaining counsel with the financial ability and long-tenn commitment
to make sure a case like this is properly pursued, cannot be overstated. This is especially true for small

firms like Mr. Wood's and Mr. Rauch,s, because the attorney has to set aside other clients and cases to
devote time to this type of litigation. It not only affects his current practice but also his ability to truce on
other representation. especially clients who pay their bill on a monthly basis and provide necessary cash
flow.
14.

The vast majority of my practice is done on a contingency fee basis. Such a practice

contains large :financial risks. I frequently evaluate new cases from the perspective ofwhether to accept

it on a contingency fee basis. My evaluation of a case like this one would be that the potential success

is far off and the risks of failure would be vecy high. An attorney in Coeur d'Alene who agreed to talce
a case on a contingency fee basis would normally recover a fee based upon thirty-three (33), forty (40)
percent, or forty-five (45) of the total recovery or more and theclientwouldhaveto pay all of the costs.

I believe that a contingency fee lawyer in this area would charge a higher rate for this case and most, if
not all. would simply refuse to accept a c.ase like this. On a contingency fee basis. 500/o would be my rate

for a case like tbi~ if! took the case at all. But I turn down cases like these on a regular basis because
of the financial risk
15.

For all these reasons, I am of the finn opinion that $300.00 per hour is a reasonable rate

of compensation at this time for Mr. Wood's work on this case.
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I have also reviewed the Declaration ofGregory R Ra~ co-counsel for Plaintiffin this

matter, and I concurtbat $250 per houris reasonable and in accordance with prevailing rates ofattorneys

with similar experience, expertise, and abilifr.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and COIIeCt under the laws of the
United S1ates to the best ofmy knowledge and belie£

DATED this 14th dayofJuly, 2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTWY that on July 14, 2011, I filed the foregoing electronically through the
CM/ECF system, which caused the following parties or counsel to be served by electronic means, as more
fully :reflected on the Notice of Electronic Filing:
BRIAN K.. JULIAN

(Qiu1ian@ajhlaw.com)
CHRIS H. HANSEN
(chhansen@ajhiaw.com)
SONYALEE R NUTSCH
(snutsch@clbnnc.com)

GREGORY R RAUCH
(grauch@magyarlawfinn.com)

TIIOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES. PLLC

T. Jason Wood
Attorneyfor Plaintiff
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Howard A. Belodoff
BELODOFP LAW OFFICE
1004 West Fort St
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Tel (208) 331-3378
Fax (208) 947...0014
1SB#2290

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JEFF D., et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

CLEMENT LEROY OTTER, et al.,
Defendants/Appellees.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Court of Appeals

Docket No. 07-36009
District Court Docket No.
CV-80-4091
AFFIDAVIT OF KURT HOLZER
IN SUPPORT OF AWARD OF
ATTORNEY FEES

)
) ss.
)

KURT HOLZER. being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states:
1.

That I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state ofldaho. I was a admitted

to the St.ate Bar in 1992 and have practiced continuously in the state of Idaho since 1993, after the

conclusion of an Appellate Court Clerkship in Utah. I have extensive civil litigation experience in
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both federal and state comt litigation. I am admitted before all state courts in the state of Idaho and

the U.S. District ofldaho. I have appeared many times before Idaho Supreme Court.
2.

Starting in 1993 ,I practiced.for seven (7) years with the Boise office ofthe law firm

of Holland & Hart, LLP, a then 220 plus lawyer multi-state law firm based in Denver. I specialized
in complex commercial and contingent-fee personal injury litigation. I have been involved in many
sophisticated litigation battles and have tried numerous cases to verdict I have handled a number of
appeals as well as cases oforiginaljmisdiction in appellate courts. In October of 2000, my partners

and I founded a multi-state firm under the name of Murphy, Holzer, & Vaugban, LLC. In January
2005, we disbanded that fmn and I became a shareholder in what is now Holzer Edwards, Chtd.
This finn has been in existence for almost twenty years.
3.

I have been an active member of the Idaho Trial Lawyers Association Board of

Directors since 1997. I served that organization as its President during 2005-06. I am currently
serving my third tenn as a member of the Professional Conduct Board of the Idaho State Bar. For a
number of years, I annually presented Idaho Supreme Court reviews to the membership of the 4th

District Bar Association. I am also member ofthe Litigation Section ofthe Idaho State Bar. Thus, I
often interact with other members of the Bar in both case advocacy and professional development
settings.

4.

My practice focuses primarily on contingent personal injwy litigation. I continue to

maintain a small portion of my practice in business and consumer litigation. My ordinary hourly-rate
ranges between $250 and $300 per hour for such litigation or for injury litigation where an hourly
rate is used. When I am working on an hourly basis, I also require that a client pay a retainer to
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insure payment of the fee. The complexities and nature ofthe litigation drive the decision making on
the appropriate hourly rate. My partner, John Edwards, charges similar amounts as his ordinary

hourly rate in such representation.
5.

At the request ofPlaintiffs' counsel, I have refamiliarized myself with the history of

this case. I have for many years--well over a decade and closer to two--had knowledge of this
litigation based on media reports and infonnal conversations with other attorneys. In 2002 and then

again in early 2007, I undertook an in-depth review of the proceedings by reviewing the docket and
filings in depth through that time.

6.

In preparing this particular Affidavit~ I have reviewed the Opening and Reply Briefs

filed in this appeal. One of the notable things that jumps out from that briefing, particularly in the
Reply Brief, is the repeated citation to and quotation from the voluminous record in the case. I

certainly understand from experience that the effort required to create such a. detailed and precise
review .ofa big record involves a huge time investment to ensure its accuracy and usefulness for the
reviewing court

7.

I am personally fiuniliar with the billing practices of a number of Boise, Idaho law

firms and lawyers. Jhave developed this knowledge in a number of ways including working within a

large firm., informal conversations with professional colleagues, presentations during professional

development conferences, and on a number of occasions, having other attorneys prepare affidavits
regarding their fee practices.

8.

There are a large number of factors that impact an attorney's hourly rate. The

factors include, but are not limited to, the unique knowledge that the attorney can put to work for the
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client, the relationship with the particular client, the risks presented by the particular litigation, the
nature of the opposing party, and the stream of business a client can provide.

9.

For example, my experience has taught me that large corporate institutions and

insurance companies get a "good deal" (i.e. a better price) and can retain lawyers who cou[d
otherwise command a higher fee because they offer a regular stream of business for the lawyer. Such

institutions also provide work tbat the more experienced attorney can have performed by younger,
less experienced lawyers.
10.

I am familiar with Howard Belodoff primarily by professional reputation. His

reputation in the legal community is as one ofthe (if not the) most knowledgeable attorneys in Idaho

regarding Civil Rights litigation. Based on my personal knowledge and review ofthe materials cited
above and given Mr. Belodoff's extensive experience and his role as lead counsel for over thirty one
(31) years, it is my opinion that an hourly rate of$400.00 per hour at the present time is warranted
under the circwnstances. It is at a minim'tlll1 similar to, and in aomc cases less than, what other
attorneys of comparable experience level in Boise would charge for the work at issue.

11.

I am familiar with a number of attorneys who would charge a higher hourly foe for

complex and difficult civil class action litigation and appeals. That is particularly true where such
litigation and appeals involves thousands of class members and state officials are the defendants.

Structural bureaucratic issues as well as the frictions created by interaction with the political
processes and the ability to ·'throw' essentially unlimited resources at the litigation. often make

governmental defendants particularly difficult and at times even unpleasant to litigate against.
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My professional opinion based on my experience, background and education is that

$400.00 an hour would be a reasonable rate if an attorney were to get paid regularly as the case
proceeded to resolution. Many attorneys who regularly work on a contingency fee basis would not

even begin the work on a case of this sophistication and magnitude unless they bad a realistic
expectation that they had a substantial possibility they would ultimately recover three to four times

the $400.00 an hour rate. I do know that there are a number of lawyers in Idaho, particularly senior
counsel with comparable years of practice as Mr. Belodoff, now charging $350.00 to $450.00 an
hour for complex litigation and appellate work.

13.

Understanding and presenting issues involving the rights ofthousands of mentally

ill children, undertaking the efforts to monitor and enforce compliance with the Consent Decrees and
Court Orders in this case all involve complex and sophisticated issues that would befuddle most

attorneys unfamiliar with the substantive law or the state programs that provide children's mental
health services. To successfully battle with often recalcitrant state agencies requires experienced,

tenacious, diligent and knowledgeable counsel such as Mr. Belodoff'who bas worked on the case and
with the clients over several decades. No attorney could replicate the depth of knowledge and
experience that he has acquired over that length of time. This also separates Mr. Belodoff from
attorneys who specialize in other areas of the Jaw but have no understanding or knowledge of the

complexities ofthis case or the factual issues presented by the plaintiffclass. The depth and breadth

of knowledge Mr. Belodoff bas developed is in a sense irreplaceable.
14.

r sat as a member of the legal. panel of the ACLU ofldaho for a number of years.

Among the items reviewed in that panel's deliberations are civil rights issues of many sorts. In that
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role, I learned ofthe attorneys in our community who have an understanding of, and a practice with
some focus on, civil rights litigation. I believe it is fair to say that there is not another lawyer in the
Boise legal community who bas the expertise or experience Mr. Belodoff has in this type of civil
rights litigation.
15.

I can state without hesitation that most attomeys in private practice would refuse to

undertake this case in the first place because of the complexity of the litigation and attorney's

unfamiliarity with the legal issues and substantive facts. Any rational attorney reviewing the case

would hesitate to tmdertake or continue with this appeal after the district court's dismissal after it
found the defendants had substantially complied with the consent decrees and court implementation
plan. It would undoubtedly appear to be a time and money sink. With my understanding ofthe case
and after reviewing plaintiff's briefing on appeal it is very apparent that the issues in this appeal were

unique, complex and postured in amanner that would make the likelihood of success seem remote.

My opinion is the limited chance of success on appeal would deter any attorney except one with the
specialized knowledge of Mr. Belodoff and with 'the devotion to his clients and the cause

demonstrated over his years of commibnent to the representation.
16.

Very significantly, the inability of the plaintiffs to pay any fees, the unique risks

associated with ever obtaining a fee award in this type of case, the long delays in receiving

compensation, and the inability of the plaintiffs to pay for costs all make a substantial hourly fee
appropriate. The difficulty, even unlikelihoody of Plaintiffs obtaining counsel with the long-tenn
commitment to make sure a case like this is properly pursued, cannot be overstaled. This is

especially true for a solo practitioner, such as Mr. Belodoff, or for a small two or three person law

AFFIDAVIT OF KURT HOLZER IN SUPJ>ORT OF AWARD OF A'ITORNEY FEES - Page 6

Jun.28.2016

22:49

Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter

4067217364

PAGE. 56

finn because the attorney has to set aside all other clients and cases to devote his full 1imeto this type
of litigation.

It not only affects his current practice but also his ability to take on other

representation
17.

system.

The type of advocacy pursued in this case honors the best traditions ofour justice

The repeated successes on behalf of the clients bespeaks of the quaJity of the work

performed.

18.

The vast majority of my practice is done on a contingency fee basis. Such a practice

contains large financial risks. I frequently evaluate new cases from the perspective of whether to
accept it on a contingency fee basis. My evaluation ofa case like this one would be that the potential
success is far off and the risks of failure would be very high. An attorney in Boise who agreed to
take a case on a contingency fee basis would nonnally recover a fee based upon thirty-three (33) or
forty (40) percent of the total recovery or more and the client would have to pay all of the costs. I

believe that a contingency fee lawyer in this area would charge a higher rate for this case and most, if
not aJI, would simply refuse to accept a case like this.
19.

The dedication of Plaintiffs' counsel after more than 31 years and the benefits

received by thousands of mentally ill Idaho children and their families, the continuing failure ofthe
Defendants' to abide by the Court's Orders, the contingent nature of the attorney's fees award, the

rates charged by other experienced counsel in this locale, certainly more than suffices for me to be of

the opinion that $400.00 per hour is.a reasonable rate ofcompensation at this time for Mr. Belodoff s
work in the appeal of th.is case.
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DATEDtbis ')Qf{dayofJune,2011. ~ - -

2011.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this lo! :.Y day of June, 2011. I electronically filed the
foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which sent a Notice of
Electronic Filing or I mailed, first class postage paid, a copy of the docwnent to the following
person:

James D. Carlson
Deputy Attorney General
Statehouse, Room210
Boise, ID 8372()..001 0

Michael S. Gilmore
Deputy Attorney General
Statehome. Room 210
· Boise ID 83720-0010

Charles Johnson

Nancy Bishop

Johnson Olson, Chtd

Deputy Attomey General
Department of Juvenile Corrections
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-5100

P.O. Box 1725
Pocatello, ID 83201

/s/ Howard Belodoff
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PAUL THOMAS CLARK
Idaho State Bar No. 1329
CLARK and FEENEY
Attorneys for Defendants
The Train Station
13th and Main Streets
P. 0. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-9516

lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

***
vs.

)
)
)
)
)

***

)
)

Plaintiff,

Case No. CV **

DEFENDANTS, MEMORANDUM
OF COSTS AND AFFIDAVIT OF
ATTORNEY FEES

)
Defendants.

)
)

)
COMES NOW the Defendants in the above-entitled action and make this Memorandum of
Costs and Affidavit of Attorney Fees expended in the above entitled action as follows:
ATTORNEY FEES

The Defendants are entitled to attorney fees because of the Court's ruling in the
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Sanctions and to Strike Pleadings
entered by the Court on December 4, 2012.
Defendants' request attorney fees pursuant to I.R.CP. 37(b)(2) and 37(e). The Defendants
have established the Plaintiff failed to comply with the Court order on discovery, and the Court is
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required to grant an award ofreasonable attorney's fees and costs to the Defendants for the money
spent pursing this motion.
As stated above, virtually all ofthe work related to the Defendants• Motion for Sanctions and
to Strike Plaintiff's Pleadings in the above-captioned matter, related to the claims of the Plaintiffs
which were dismissed. The total sum of $660.00 is reasonable for Defendants' attorney fees based
on the work and expertise that was involved in this case. Exhibit A attached hereto, and made a part
hereof by reference, shows most of the Defendants' attorneys' services rendered on or near the dates
shown; that all services shown on said Exhibit A were reasonable and necessary; that Defendants'
attorneys and paralegals have expended at least 2.4 hours based upon the time shown on said Exhibit
A; the following attorneys/paralegals have worked on the case as indicated by timekeeper code on
the attached Detailed Fee Transaction File List marked Exhibit A:

Name of Person
Timekeeper Performing Work

Position

Paul Thomas Clark

Attorney

01

Hourly Rate
$ 275.00

The hourly rates charged for legal services above mentioned are reasonable and were necessary for
the defense of this case. The Defendants were billed at said hourly rates on a monthly basis as work

was performed.
The undersigned is an attorney who has been licensed to practice and has practiced in Idaho

since 1970. The undersigned is familiar with the normal charges for work done in cases of this
nature. It is the opinion of the undersigned that the sum of$660.00 is a reasonable to be awarded
to be awarded in this matter.
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DATED this _ _ day ofDeoernber, 2012.

CLARK and FEENEY

By~~~~~~~~~~~~
Paul Thomas Clark, a member of the firm.
Attorneys for Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Nez Perce

)

)ss.

PAUL THOMAS CLARK, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
That he is the attorney for the Defendants herein; that he has read the foregoing instrument,
knows the contents thereof and the facts stated therein are to the best of his knowledge, information
and belief, and that the costs claimed are in conformance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

PAUL THOMAS CLARK

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this --- day December, 2012.
Notary Public in and for the State ofldaho
Residing at Lewiston therein.
My Commission expires:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ _ day ofDecember, 2012, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Greg Monzo
PO Box 5411
Beaverton, OR 97006

D
0
0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Greg Monzo
POBox522

0
D
D
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail

Caldwell, ID 83606

Telecopy

By.~-~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~~~
Attorney for Defendants
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Lewis County Districi Court

FlLED

()

AT~l©'CLOCK:t:.M

Charles H. Carpenter
Idaho Bar No. 8322
Carpenter Law Firm plc

JU~~ 2016

210 N. Higgins Avenue Suite 336
Missoula, Montana 59802
(406) 543-0511
carpentc@carpenterlawfirmplc.com

Attornry for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
LEWIS COUNTY

PERRY KRINI1T
Plaintiff,

v.

)
)
)

No. CV 12-146

)

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
FISH AND GAME, and
STATE OF IDAHO,

___________
Defendants.

)
)
)

1,ffiMORANDUM IN 0PP0Sffi0N
TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER

)
)
))

The Motion to Reconsider filed by the Idaho Department of Fish and Grune
("Fish & Game") adds neither relevant facts nor legal argument omitted from the
Summary Judgment argument heard by the Court in May 2016. The facts underlying

the Rule 16(i) sanction imposed are not in dispute, nor does Fish & Game contest
them meaningfully. There is and can be no dispute that Fish & Game failed to assert

its statutory employer immunity defense prior to March 2016. The rules of civil
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procedure are clear that this should have been done years earlier although this Court,
following the Supreme Court in Fuhriman v. Department ofTransp., 143 Idaho 800

(2007), has been, in Krinitt's view, overly generous in allowing the assertion of the
defense at all, and there is a~d can be no dispute that Fish & Grune failed to follow
the rules or the scheduling order in bringing its Motion for Summary Judgment so
late. There is, further, no dispute that the Court has the authority, in its discretion, to
award sanctions under Rule 16(i). Fish & Game's Motion to Reconsider, then is mere
disagreement with the Court's imposition of a sanction.
It offers no reasons for this disagreement not already presented to the Court.
It claims that the failure to timely assert the defense was an oversight of counsel- this
was thoroughly discussed at the hearing, and is well reflected in the Court's opinion.
It does not, and cannot, argue that the Court was unaware that it was exercising
discretion, that it exceeded the bounds of its discretion, or that the Court did not
reach its decision to impose a sanction through an exercise of reason. Sec Westry v.

Schaefer, 17 Idaho 116,621 (2014). Finally, Fish & Game does not address the very
real harm its "oversight" caused Krinitt. It thus misses the Court's point completely.
Instead of offering new facts relevant to the sanction, or new legal argument,
Fish & Game seems more interested in offering its account about why the mediation
failed. Krinitt finds this inappropriate, unseemly, and disagrees completely with Fish
& Game's suggestion that he is at fault for the failure of the mediation. An Affidavit

from Krinitt's counsel is attached hereto; it concerns only the mediation, and if the
2
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Court agrees that consideration of the discussions at the mediation is improper at this
point, Krinitt asks that the Court disregard his counsel's Affidavit and that of Mt.
Johnson.

In sum, Fish & Game has given the Court no good reason to vacate its
imposition of a sanction. For this reason, the Motion to Reconsider should be
denied.
./

....--

Respectfully subnµited
.,··'

.;t,::>--

r , ..

,,>..,....

,..-_;j/

fl''

c:.~·~:rI.-Carpenter
1.......__..J
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify on the 29th day of June, 2016, I served the foregoing by mailing,
by fax and by email to:
Peter J. Johnson
JOHNSON LAW GROUP
103 E. Indiana, Suite A
Spokane, WA 99207-2317
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Jul.10.2016

19:46

406721 r

Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter
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Lewis County District Court

. J/

Charles H. Carpenter

kflLED j

ATj-r--4-0'CLOCKf!M

Idaho Bar No. 8322

JUL 11 2015

Carpenter Law Firtn pk
210 N. Higgins Avenue Suite 336
Missoula, Montana 59802
(406) 543-0511
caq:,cntc@car.pentetlawfirmpk.com

AttomfJfor Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

LEWIS COUNTY
PERRY K.RINITr
Plaintiff,

v.

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
FIS.I-I AND GAME, and
STATE OF IDAB0 1

____________
Defendant~.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. CV 12-146

AGREED UPON CALCULATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO FEES & COSTS

)

)
))

As disc1.tssed at the hearing Friday, counsel have consulted and worked thmugh
the calculations together, They agree as follows

M•

the maximum cost/ fee amouht

under the Court's June 1, 2016 Order is $71)981.83. The agreed upon floor for costs

and fees, if any arc awarded, is $58,279.83.
The balance, $13,702.00, is in dispute, and is comprised of three categories:

$9,402 for Carpenter's attorney's fees in connection with the 2016 Summary

00178

2/

4

Jul.10.2016

19:46

Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter

40672' 364

Judgment Motion; $3,400.00 for Sullivan's attorney's fees in connection with the
mediation; and $900.00 for McPherson's travd expenses in connection with the

expert depositions in Denver.
Mr.Johnson agrees with these calculations.
itted

2
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PAGE.

4

Jul.10.2016

19:47

Harrison/Trigg/Carpenter

406721~ -4

PAGE.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify on the 11 111 day of July, 2016, I served the foregoing by fax to;
Peter J. Johnson
JOHNSON LAW GROUP
103 E. Indiana, Suite A

Spokane, WA 99207..2317

-·--- . - ·~
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FILED
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS
PERRY KRINITT,et.a/.

)

CASE NO. CV12-146

)
Plaintiffs,

)
)

vs.

)

STATE OF IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND
GAME, et. al.

)
)
)
)
)

__________
Defendants.

JUDGMENT

)
)

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Plaintiff Perry Krinitt is awarded attorney fees and costs in the amount of
$68,581.83.
DATED this

.

Q/

~
day of July, 2016.

Judgment...1

0018?

"'" .... ,

tt{!t

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

. I, t he ~~igned Deputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby certify that
1

on this ~ a y of July, 2016, served a true and correct copy of the Judgment by
mail or fax to:

Peter J. Johnson
103 E. Indiana, Suite A
Spokane,\NA 99207-2317

Charles H. Carpenter
210 N. Higgins Ave. Suite 336
Missoula, Montana 59802

.+Mail

- - -Fax

f

Mail

- - -Fax

Judgment-2
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Lewis County Disrrict Court

F~<; l!"."'D

_!_/,; • ~ LC

..,o_

Al-1=£.L_O'CLOCK//_.M

JUL 2 1 2016

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS

PERRY KRINITT,et.a/.
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)

)
vs.

CASE NO. CV12-146
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

)

)
STATE OF IDAHO
.
DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND
GAME, et. al.

___________
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendant Idaho Department of Fish and Game, (IDFG) has timely asked the
· Court to reconsider the portion of its order dated June 1, 2016 which granted Plaintiff
Perry Krinitt {Krinitt) expenses and attorney fees incurred since January 31, 2014. The
Court imposed the fees as a sanction under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16(i) because
IDFG filed their dispositive motion after the scheduling orde~ cut-off date of January 31,
2014.
The decision to grant or deny a motion to reconsider is committed to the
discretion of the Court. Dawson v. Cheyovich FamUy Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 380, 234
P.3d 699, 704 (2010).

lt is also within the Court's discretion to impose sanctions for not complying with
a pre-trial scheduling order. Lepperv. E. Idaho Health Servs., Inc., 160 Idaho 104, 369
P.3d 882, 887 (2016), reh'g denied (Apr. 15, 2016). In fashioning sanctions, a trial
court should 'balance the equities by comparing the culpability of the disobedient party

Order denying motion to reconsider-I

0018'1

with the resulting prejudice to the innocent party.' Peterson v. Mccawley 135 Idaho
282,284, 16 P.3d 958,960 (Ct. App. 2000), citation omitted.
In its Order, dated June 1, 2016, the Court stated that the Department's delay in
filing its dispositive motion was not substantially justified and that there are no
circumstances which would make the awarding of fees and expenses to Krinitt unjust.
Krinitt was ah innocent party that incurred a great amount of litigation expense and time
needlessly pursuing a negligence claim. Prejudice to the wronged party is considered
to be an aggravating factor when awarding sanctions. Fish Haven Resort, Inc. v.

,Amold, 121 Idaho 118, 122, 822 P.2d 1015, 1019 (Ct. App. 1991).
In imposing the attorney fee sanction, this Court made the punishment fit the
crime and was not a sanction that prevented the adjudication of the merits of the matter.

Id;, citing S. Idaho Prod. CreditAss'n

v. Astorquia, concurring opinion, 113 Idaho 526,

529,746 P.2d 985, 988 {1987).
Courts

11
•••

cannot function efficiently unless they can effectively require

compliance with reasonable rules. Absence of meaningful power to require that
compliance would make for disorder and preclude effective judicial administration at the

trial court level.' ,, Id., citing Devault v. Steven L. Herndon, A Prof/ Ass'n, 107 Idaho 1,

3,684 P.2d 978, 980 (1984}, quoting Chism v. National Heritage Ute Ins. Co., 637 F.2d
1328, 1332 (9th Cir.1981).
Based upon the above, defendant's motion for reconsideration of its order dated
June 1, 2016 which granted Plaintiff expenses and attorney fees incurred since January

__....

31, 2014 is denied.
DATED this

qjJ

J / day of July, 2016.

District Judge

Order denying :motion to reconsider-2

0018~)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, th~ yr.rsigned Deputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby certify that
on thi&&l--day of Ju~ 2016, served a true and correct copy of the Order Denying
Motion to Reconsider by wfuil or fax to:

Peter J. Johnson
103 E. Indiana, Suite A
Spokane,VVA 99207-2317

_ _ _Fax

Charles H. Carpenter
210 N. Higgins Ave. Suite 336
Missoula, Montana 59802

_ _ _Fax

/)(

Mai!
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Lewis County District Cou,t

t-;:__, FILED
1

AT~O'CLOCK/j2.M

JUL 2 1 2016
By.

/Tirr-'"~W-1-~-

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS

PERRY KRINITT,et.a/.
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV12-146
ATTORNEY FEES ORDER

)
VS.
STATE OF IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND
GAME, et. al.

_______
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

Plaintiff Krinitt has submitted a Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees
in response to the Court's order, dated June 1, 2016. Defendant Department of Fish
and Game filed a Motion to Disallow a Portion of Plaintiff's Costs and Attorney Fees.
The Court heard argument on the Motion at a telephonic hearing held July 8, 2016. At
that hearing the parties agreed to consult and agree on a floor for costs and fees and
the maximum amount to be awarded.
Remaining in dispute, as outlined in the document filed July 11, 2016 are $9,402
for Plaintiff's attorney fees in connection with the 2016 summary judgment motion,
$3,400 for a California consulting attorney, and $900 for a consulting expert to travel to
depositions. The parties agreed that the maximum amount that the Court could award
was $71,981.83. A minimum of $58,279.83 was also set.
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allow the Court to impose attorney fee sanctions
for violations of pre-trial orders. Nepanuseno v. Hansen, 140 Idaho 942,947, 104 P.3d
984, 989 (Ct. App. 2004). The choice of sanction is committed to the discretion of the
Attorney fee order-1

00187

Court. Aho v. Idaho Transp. Dep't of State, 145 idaho 192, 194, 177 P.3d 406, 408 (Ct.

App. 2·008).
The Court finds that the per hour fee of attorney Charles H. Carpenter is

reasonable and that in considering the reason for the sanctiont fees incurred in the
amount of $9,402 for the 2016 summary judgment motion are awarded. Consulting
expert travel costs to depositions were also a reasonable and necessary and are

awarded. The Court further finds that fees for a consulting attorney in California were

not necessary. Carpenter's attendance at the mediation in California was sufficient,
Fees for the California attorney are not awarded.
THEREFORE, attorney fees in the amount of $68,581.83 are awarded to Plaintiff
Perry Krinitt.

DATED this

t:J f

pk:

day of July, 2016.

Attorney fee order-2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

!,W~igned Deputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby certify that

on this

day of July, 2016, served a true and correct copy of the Attorney Fee

Order by mail or fax to:

Peter J. Johnson

103 E. Indiana, Suite A
Spokane, WA 99207-2317

Charles H. Carpenter
21 O N. Higgins Ave. Suite 336
Missoula, Montana 59802

Attorney fee order-3
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Lewis County District Court

F~LED
A ;/.:[:[i(O' CLOC#y(_ M
AUG 2 9 2016
PETER J. JOHNSON, ISB # 4105
Johnson Law Group
103 E. Indiana, Suite A
Spokane, WA 99207-2317
Phone: (509) 835-5000
Fax:
(509) 326-7503
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS

PERRY KRINITT,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

NO. CV 12-146
NOTICE OF APPEAL

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND
GAME and STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendants-Appellants.

TO: CHARLES H. CARPENTER, CARPENTERLAWFIRM,210N. HIGGINS AVENUE, SUITE
336, MISSOULA, MT. 59802, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above named appellants, Idaho Department of Fish and Game, and State of Idaho,
appeal against the above-named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Attorney fees
Order and Judgment in favor of respondent entered in the above-entitled action on July 21, 2016, by

JOHNSON LAW GROUP

001~.10
NOTICE OF APPEAL - l

103 E. Indiana, Suite A
Spokane, WA 99207-2317
TEL: (509) 835-5000 FAX: (509) 326-7'\01

the Honorable Judge Fitzmaurice presiding. A copy of the Judgment and Attorney Fees Order is
attached to this notice.
2. Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court as the judgment described
in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(l) I.A.R.

3. Appellants intend to raise the following issue on appeal:
(a)

Whether the district court properly awarded respondent attorney fees and costs
notwithstanding the fact that appellants were the prevailing party when the district
court dismissed respondent's lawsuit with prejudice.

4.

No transcript is being requested.

5.

The appellants request the following documents be included in the clerk's record in
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. and those already
submitted with the Clerk's Record on appeal in connection with appeal filed by the
plaintiff-respondent in this appeal on July 11, 2016.

(a)

Defendants Memorandum Of Authorities In Support Of Reconsideration Of A
Portion Of The Summary Judgment Memorandum Order And Judgment;

(b)

Verified Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees;

(c)

Defendants Motion To Disallow A Portion Of Plaintiff's Costs And Attorney Fees;

(d)

Defendant's Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Disallow Certain Of Plaintiff's
Submitted Costs And Attorney Fees;

(e)

Memorandum In Opposition To Motion To Disallow Certain Costs;

(f)

Memorandum In Opposition To Motion To Reconsider;

(g)

Memorandum In Opposition To Motion To Disallow Certain Costs;

(h)

Agreed Upon Calculation With Respect To Fees And Costs;

(i)

Judgment;

(j)

Order Denying Motion To Reconsider;

(k)

Attorney Fees Order.

6.

No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record.

JOHNSON LAW GROUP

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

0019t

103 E. Indiana, Suite A
Spokane, WA 99207-2317
TEL: (50()) R1'i-'iOOO PAY· ,,nm.,-,;:

..,~M

7. I certify:
(a)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

(b)

That no filing fee is required by the State of Idaho or it agency pursuant to state law.

(c)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule
20. See Certificate of Service appended hereto.

DATED:

August 26, 2016.
Respectfully submitted

B ~~~'----r-+--,"
_/?_.~-~-·~----·--_,_'
'-+-~-'
PETERJ.J
0
JOHNSON LAW GROUP
103 E. Indiana, Suite A
Spokane, WA 99207
Telephone: (509) 835-5000
Facsimile: (509) 326-7503
pjohnson@johnsonl aw .org
Attorney for Defendants

00192
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3

JOHNSON LAW GROUP
I 03 E. Indiana, Suite A
Spokane, WA 99207-2317
TEL: r.c;ocn R1.c;:_.c;:nnn

oA v. ,c:nn, "'"""
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

·11

!J-

I hereby certify that on the~ day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a copy of the
foregoing by mail to the following:
Charles H. Carpenter
Carpenter Law Firm, PLC
210 N. Higgins A venue, Suite 336
Missoula, MT 59802
Phone: (406)543-0511
Fax:
(406) 258-0365

Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General
State of Idaho
700 W. Jefferson Street, Suite 201
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

JOHNSON LAW GROUP
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4

001~3

103 E. Indiana, Suite A
Spokane, WA 99207-2317
TEL: (509) 835-5000 FAX: (509) 326-7503

Lewis County Dfstrfct Court

l/~;FILED
1

AT...jf:i.L0 CLOCKj!_M

JUL 2 5 REC'J

JUL 2 1 2015

-!OHNSON LAW GRQ(Jp

IN THE DI.STRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE :OF 1DAHO, IN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWI$

PERRY KRINITT,efa:~J..

)
)

PJ1;1irrtiffs1

)

)
vs.

CASE NO-. CV12-146

JUDGME.N'T

}
).
}

STATE-OF IDAHO

DEPARTMENT OFFISH.AND

:GAME, et. .al

)

)
)
)

Defendants.

----------}
,JUDGMENT JS ENTERED ~S l=OLLOWS;
Plaintiff Perry Krinitt is awarded attorney fees:and costs in the amount Of

'$68,581,63.
DATED this

_

Q/

et.-

·day of July; 2016.,

)udgment..1
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..
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the UJ).~rsigned Deputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby certify that
on this ~ a y of July, 2016, served a true and correct copy of the Judgment by

mail or fax to:
Peter J. Johnson

103 E. Indiana, Suite A

Spokane,VVA 99207-2317

Charles H. Carpenter
210 N. Higgins Ave. Suite 336
Missoula, Montana 5980?

+Mail

_ _ _Fax

.f

Mail

_ _ _F,ax

Judgment-2
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.. '
COPY REC~IVED

Lewis County District Court

t.-i~,FILED

JUL 2 6 REC'J

AT~ 0 CLOCK_,f2.M

JOHNSON LAW GROUP

JUL 2 1 2018

1

IN TH~ DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNffY OF LEWIS
PERRY KRINllT,et.a/.
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)

vs.

)

STATE OF IDAHO

)

DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND
GAME, et. al.

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV12-146

ATTORNEY FEES ORDER

)

_______
Defendants.

Plaintiff Krinitt has submitted a Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees
in response to the Court's order, dated June 1, 2016. Defendant Department of Fish
and Game filed a Motion to Disallow a Portion of Plaintiff's Costs and Attorney Fees.
The Court heard argument on the Motion at a telephonic hearing held July 8, 2016. At
that hearing the parties agreed to consult and agree on a floor for costs and fees and

the maximum amount to be awarded.
Remaining in dispute, as outlined in the document filed July 11, 2016 are $9,402
for Plaintiff's attorney fees in connection with the 2016 summary judgment motion,
$3,400 for a California consulting attorney, and $900 for a consulting expert to travel to
depositions. The parties agreed that the maximum amount that the Court could award

was $71,981.83. A minimum of $58,279.83 was also set.
Idaho Rules of CiVil Procedure allow the Court to impose attorney fee sanctions
for violations of pre-trial orders. Nepanuseno v. Hansen, 140 Idaho 942, 947, 104 P .3d

984, 989 (Ct. App. 2004). The choice of sanction is committed to the discretion of the

Attorney fee order-1

00196

.

\

Court. Aho v. Idaho Trahsp~ Dep't of State, 145 Idaho 192,194, 177 P.3d 406,408 (Cf.
App. 2'"008).
The -Col,Jrt finderthat the per hour fee of attorney Charles H, Carpenter is
reasonabJe and that in considering the reason for the .sanction.,. fee$· incurred in the

amount of $9,402 fortlie 2Q1.6. summary judgm~nt motion are awarded. Consulting
-expert travel costs· to depositions wsr~ ~leo a reasonable and necessary and. are
·awarded. lhe Court further finds th<\t fees for a oonsulting attorney in California were

not necesS.~ry. Carpenter's attendance .at the mediation .in California· was sufficient,

Fees for the California attomey are not awarded.
THEREFORE, attorney fees in the amount of $68.,581 ..83 are l:iwarded to Plaintiff

Peny .Kri.nftt.

. ~

DA1"E:b th.is Q

f

day. of Ji,lly, ~016.

Attomeyfee order-2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
l,~.!!:,njersigned Deputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby certify that
on thisC{..[.2: d~y of July, 2016, served a true and correct copy of the Attorney Fee

Order by mail or fax to:

I

Peter J. Johnson
103 E. Indiana, Suite A

Spokane,VVA 99207-2317

---Fax

H. Carpent~r
210 N. Higgins Ave. Suite 336
Missoula, Montana 59802

Charles

Attorney fee order-3
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS
PERRY KRINITT,

)

Plaintiff/Respondent

Supreme Court No.

4 L/~ ~

)

vs.

)

Case No: CV-2012-0000146

)
STATE OF IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME, and

)

STATE OF IDAHO.

)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

Defendant/Appellant

Appeal from: SECOND Judicial District, LEWIS County. Honorable GREGORY FITZMAURICE
presiding.
Case number from court or agency: CV2012-146

Order or judgment appealed from: ATTORNEY FEES ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Attorney for Appellant: PETER JJOHNSON
Attorney for Respondent: CHARLES H CARPENTER
Appealed by: IDAHO FISH AND GAME and STATE OF IDAHO
Appealed against: PERRY KRINITT
Notice of Appeal filed: AUGUST 29, 2016
Notice of Cross Appeal filed: NA
Amended Notice of Cross Appeal filed: NA
Appellate fee paid: $20.00
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional record filed: NA
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional reporter's transc~\~~JijJ.fRJ1~;· •••

. -ju

Was District Court Reporter's transcript requested? NO
Dated
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
PERRY KRINITT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND
GAME and STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendants-Respondents.

l

f1

PERRY KRINITI,
Plaintiff- Respondent,.
v.

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND
GAME and STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendants-Appellants.

)
)
)
)
)

ORDER

Supreme Court Docket No. 44326-2016
Lewis County No. CV-2012-146

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

1i

Supreme Court Docket No. 44442-2016
Lewis County No. CV-2012-146

11

i

A NOTICE OF APPEAL was filed in the District Court, on August 29, 2016, from the

11

JUDGMENT entered by District Judge Gregory FitzMaurice and filed on July 21, 2016; which was

l

then assigned to Supreme Court Docket No. 44442. The Clerk's Record in prior appeal No. 44326,

I

Record and Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 42417, Krinitt v. Idaho Dept. of Fish and Game

Krinitt v. Idaho Dept. of Fish and Game (Lewis CV-2012-146) was augmented to include the
11

!f

(Lewis CV-2012-146). Therefore,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Supreme Court Docket Nos. 44326 and 44442 shall be

CONSOLIDATED FOR ALL PURPOSES under appeal No. 44326..
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and file a LIMITED

i

i

CLERK'S RECORD with this Court, which shall contain documents requested in the Notice of
Appeal in Docket No. 44442; together with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any
document included in the Clerk's Record filed in appeal Nos. 42417 and 44326. This LIMITED
CLERK'S RECORD shall be prepared and served on counsel by Friday~ September 16, 2016.

ORDER - Docket Nos. 44326 I 44442

-

'\

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the due date for filing the CLERK'S RECORD AND
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT in these consolidated appeals shall remain set for September 27,
2016. Upon this Court· s~ipt of the Record and Transcript, a briefing schedule shall be set.

ll

DATED this

P,_

dayofSeptember, 2016.

el A. Lehrman,

·ef Deputy Clerk for _

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clede
cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
Court Reporter
District Judge Gregory FitzMaurice

Entered on JS!
By:

ORDER - Docket Nos. 44326 I 44442

\ty

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS
Perry Krinitt,
Plaintiff/Respondent
CASE NO. CV-2012-146
Supreme Court No. 44442-2016
vs.
Certificate of Mailing
State of Idaho Department of
Fish and Game and
State of Idaho,
Defendants/Appellants.

I, the undersigned, a Deputy Clerk of the above entitled
Court, do hereby certify that a copy of the Limited Clerk's Record
was

mailed

on

I :S?±Lt'- day

of

~---9.(J)~

,

persons:
Charles Carpenter
210 N Higgins Ave
Missoula MT 59802
Peter J Johnson
103 E Indiana Suite A
Spokane WA 99207-2317

)

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING - 1

00202

2016

to

the

following

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS

Perry Krinitt,
PLAINTIFF/ RESPONDENT

LEWIS COUNTY NO.CV-12-146
Supreme Court
Docket NO. 44442-2016

vs.
State of Idaho Department of
Fish and Game and
State of Idaho
DEFENDANTS/APPELLANT

NOTICE OF LODGING
LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD

;J_'lf> day

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT on the
("7"-f'f-....;--

r

.

of

, 2016, the Clerk's record in the above referenced

was lodged with the District Court Clerk.
The parties shall have five

(5) days from the date of

service of the appeal record to file any objections,
together with a Notice of Hearing, with the District Court.
If no objection is filed, the record will be deemed settled
and will be filed with the Supreme Court.
Alesia Winner,

Cc:
Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101

NOTICE OF LODGING

n·~:>ni
) u -~ •)

